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5.1 Introduction
What role, if any, do large traders and other highly leveraged institutions
(HLIs) such as hedge funds (HFs) and proprietary desks of commercial and
investment banks play in determining and propagating market volatility
during crisis episodes? Some policy makers and analysts have expressed
concern that the activity of large players in small markets (“big elephants in
small ponds”) may trigger crises that are not justiﬁed by fundamentals,
destabilizing foreign exchange and other asset markets, creating systemic
risk, and threatening the stability of the international ﬁnancial system.
A typical argument is that the presence of large agents increases a coun-
try’s vulnerability to a crisis because their short-term portfolio strategies
provide a focal point for speculative behavior and induce small investors,
other things being equal, to be more aggressive in their position-taking.
True, phenomena such as herding (buying or selling an asset because other
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institution with which the authors are aﬃliated.participants buy or sell at the same time), momentum trading (buying an as-
set when its price rises and selling when its price falls), noise trading, band-
wagon eﬀects, short-termism, and the like can occur in ﬁnancial markets
even if all agents are small and atomistic. However, market power stemming
from size, reputation, and ability to leverage may give large players a signif-
icant role in aﬀecting market dynamics with destabilizing consequences.
Speciﬁcally, concerns about the aggressive, possibly manipulative, prac-
tices of large traders were expressed in 1998 by the authorities of a number
of small and medium-sized economies. To assess these allegations, the HLI
working group of the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) established in 1999
a study group on market dynamics in small and medium-sized economies,
which conducted a study of the 1998 market turmoil and the role played by
HLIs in six countries (Hong Kong, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa,
Singapore, and Malaysia).
Although the group could not reach consensus on the allegations of
destabilization and distortion of market integrity, the report found circum-
stantial evidence of aggressive trading practices, pointing out the material
role played by large players in some crises. Notably, the conclusions of the
Market Dynamics Study Group, published in April 2000 (Financial Stabil-
ity Forum 2000), were somewhat diﬀerent from a previous study on HFs by
the International Monetary Fund (IMF 1998). The IMF study, which was
limited to the events in Asia up to late 1997, had concluded that HFs had
not played a signiﬁcant role in the early market turbulence.
In light of the results of these reports and, more generally, in light of the
policy and academic debate on the 1997–98 events, our contribution aims
to reconsider in detail, at both theoretical and empirical levels, the role that
large players can play in currency crises and market dynamics.
This paper is organized as follows. In section 5.2 we present a stylized
model of speculative attacks, analyzing the eﬀect of large investors on the
vulnerability of a country to currency crises. We ﬁrst focus on a model in
which speculative attacks are the outcome of self-fulﬁlling shifts in expec-
tations from “good” to “bad” equilibria, in situations in which the eco-
nomic fundamentals are neither too strong (ruling out crises altogether)
nor too weak (so that a crisis is unavoidable).
Next, we consider a model with asymmetric and private information,
building on the “global-games” literature (Morris and Shin 2000, Corsetti
et al. 2000). In this model, the impact of a large trader on the market de-
pends on the interaction of three elements: size, reputation for quality of in-
formation, and the ability to signal its portfolio position to the rest of the
market. The key result is that, in general, the presence of large investors
makes all other investors more aggressive, in the sense that the latter choose
to liquidate their currency positions for stronger economic fundamentals
relative to the case in which there are no large investors.
We conclude the theoretical section by discussing extensions of the model
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must a trader be to have a signiﬁcant impact on market behavior? Do large
players always beneﬁt from signalling their trading? Or do they beneﬁt from
trading quietly to avoid adverse movement of prices while building their po-
sitions? Do they inhibit contrarian trade? Can large players manipulate
markets (through cornering, “talking one’s book,” spreading rumors, etc.)?
On the basis of the results of section 5.2, section 5.3 provides an overview
and an extension of the empirical literature on the behavior of large in-
vestors in currency markets. We ﬁrst look at the evidence on the correlation
between exchange rate movements and major market participants’ net cur-
rency positions. We next consider a few recent case studies. A number of
sources, ranging from press articles to academic case studies, have suggested
that large HFs and HLIs played a role in numerous episodes of market dis-
tress in the 1990s, including the following: the exchange rate mechanism cri-
sis in 1992–93; the 1994 U.S. bond market turbulence; the 1994–95 Mexican
peso crisis; the speculative attack on the Thai baht in 1997; the fall of the Ko-
rean won in 1997; the crisis of the Malaysian ringgit in 1997–98; the “double
play” on the Hong Kong stock and foreign exchange markets in 1998; the
pressures on the Australian dollar in June and August 1998; the unraveling
of the “carry trade” in the summer of 1998 and the rally of the Japanese yen;
and the Russia to Brazil contagion episode in the summer and fall of 1998.
We focus on a sample of these events and conclude by highlighting the links
between our analysis and the ﬁndings of the FSF (2000) study.
There are two important premises to our assessment of the role of large
players in crisis episodes. First, in the context of our study, a large player is
deﬁned as an agent with market power. The inﬂuence of a large player on the
market outcome is not, however, mechanically related to its size, as mea-
sured by the value of asset holdings or market share. Clearly, players with
equal size can diﬀer in their ability to inﬂuence the portfolio strategies of
other agents in the market, owing to, for instance, access to superior infor-
mation or special forecasting ability. There are a number of reasons to expect
a positive association between a trader’s size and its reputation for quality of
information. For instance, traders controlling a large portfolio of assets are
able to devote more resources to data collection and analysis and thus are
more likely to obtain superior information. However, large traders need not
be better informed in all circumstances. If smaller market participants can
better exploit information asymmetries and other market ineﬃciencies, the
actions of large traders may have only limited inﬂuence. To shed light on this
issue, our analysis is carried out under diﬀerent assumptions about the pre-
cision of the large trader’s information relative to the rest of the market.
Second, while herding may have exacerbated swings in capital ﬂows and the
ensuing changes in asset prices, it was a large set of investors—domestic and
foreign, small and large, highly leveraged and not—who jointly contributed
to market volatility in the turmoil episodes of the 1990s. Thus, although it is
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episodes, it is crucial to understand their role in the broader macroeconomic
context in which these events occurred. In fact, most of the crisis episodes con-
sidered in this study unfolded against the backdrop of deteriorating macro-
economic fundamentals, policy uncertainties, and structural weaknesses.
5.2 Modeling the Role of Large Traders in Speculative Attacks
In this section we analyze leading theories of currency and ﬁnancial
crises, with the goal of understanding the role of large traders in generating
and sustaining speculative attacks. We consider two classes of models of co-
ordination games. The ﬁrst allows for multiple instantaneous equilibria and
sunspots, therefore interpreting the crisis as a switch from one rational-
expectations equilibrium to another. The second focuses on games in which
agents rely on private information in forming their beliefs about the funda-
mentals of the economy, as well as about other agents’ beliefs and strategies.
In these latter games, known as global games, the nature of crises is rooted
not in the multiplicity of equilibria but in a stochastic ﬂow of unobservable
private information.
Our analysis focuses on static games, analyzing the decision process of
agents who have to decide, independently and simultaneously, whether or
not to attack a currency. A subsection deals with an example of a dynamic
game with Bayesian learning (as discussed in Dasgupta 2001), in which
agents may choose to take a position before the rest of the market or to wait
so as to gain information by observing trading activity. We conclude with a
discussion of open issues, pointing at a new generation of models that syn-
thesize desirable features from diﬀerent approaches.
5.2.1 A Uniﬁed Analytical Framework
To begin, consider a small open economy where the central bank pegs the
exchange rate at some parity. The economy is populated by a continuum of
risk-neutral traders, each of whom can take an inﬁnitesimal position
against the currency. In addition, there may be a single trader who can take
a “large”—that is, discrete—position against the currency.
Let   denote the mass of ﬁnancial resources that are mobilized by (small
and large) speculators when attacking the currency. The variable  varies be-
tween zero (nobody attacks the currency) and 1 (the whole market attacks
the currency).1 As a stylized way to model heterogeneity in agents’ size, we
allow for a single large player that can mobilize resources up to   1. The
combined mass of resources available to small traders then amounts to 1 –  .
Because the focus of the analysis is on speculative attacks, we abstract
200 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini
1. To motivate the boundaries on  , one can think of factors such as credit constraints, short-
sale restrictions, or prudential guidelines limiting the size of speculative open positions in a
currency market.from welfare-related considerations (a devaluation can be either good or
bad for the economy), so the reasons that monetary authorities decide to re-
linquish the peg are not explicitly analyzed. It may be helpful to keep in
mind the textbook example of an economy endowed with a stock of inter-
national reserves, where the central bank is willing to defend the exchange
rate only as long as reserves are above some predetermined critical level.
The central bank sets this level based on its assessment of the economic fun-
damentals of the country, indexed by  in our model. The critical level is low
when fundamentals are strong (  is high): the central bank is willing to use
a large amount of reserves to defend the exchange rate. Conversely, the crit-
ical level is high when fundamentals are weak (  is low): even a mild specu-
lative attack can force the central bank to abandon the peg.
The condition for a currency collapse is therefore
(1)      .
Since 0       1, a collapse always occurs if   is negative (the economic out-
look is so bad that the central bank has no incentive to maintain the peg
even if no attack materializes) and never occurs if   1. A collapse may or
may not occur for 0    1, depending on whether the currency is attacked
by a suﬃcient mass of speculators.
For simplicity, we assume that the ex post payoﬀs to individual agents are
independent of the state of fundamentals.2 From the viewpoint of each
agent, taking a speculative position in the currency market entails a cost t
  1, including both transaction costs and the diﬀerential between the do-
mestic and the foreign interest rate. Thus, if an agent attacks the currency
but the currency does not collapse, its ex post payoﬀ is –t, that is, the loss
due to transaction costs incurred when speculating. If, instead, the currency
collapses, the ex post payoﬀ is assumed to be 1 – t. If the agent does not at-
tack, the payoﬀ is identically equal to 0. All of these payoﬀs are measured
per unit of domestic currency.
Agents take their speculative positions independently and simultane-
ously.3 The timing is as follows: (1) Agents have a uniform ignorance prior
about  —that is,   is uniformly distributed over the real line.4 At the begin-
ning of the period, they receive a signal about the state of fundamentals.
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2. As will be apparent in what follows, the extension to the general case would conﬁrm and
strengthen our results.
3. In most of our study, we abstract from intertemporal considerations and focus on one-
period models. Below we discuss a model that allows for a sequential-move game among spec-
ulators.
4. As pointed out by Morris and Shin (2000), improper priors make it possible to concen-
trate on the updated beliefs of the traders conditional on their signals without taking into ac-
count the information contained in the prior distribution. In any case, results with the im-
proper prior can be seen as the limiting case as the information in the prior density goes to zero.
See Hartigan (1983) for a discussion of improper priors and Morris and Shin (section 2) for a
discussion of the latter point.(2) Agents take their speculative positions in the foreign exchange market
at given prices;   is determined. (3) The state of the economy   is revealed.
(4)The central bank either defends or devalues the exchange rate according
to equation (1).
5.2.2 Models with Symmetric Information
Common Knowledge and Multiple Equilibria
We now discuss models of currency and ﬁnancial crises that stress the
role of multiple equilibria, focusing ﬁrst on the baseline case in which all
agents are atomistic. Consider the following speciﬁcation of the informa-
tion structure: previous to trading, all agents receive the same public signal
y about the fundamentals  :
(2) y          0
where E( )   0 and the probability distribution function of   is symmetric
and smooth (we write H for the cumulative distribution function).5 Note
that agents do not know the exact state of the fundamentals. Given the uni-
form prior about  , their posterior distribution of the fundamentals is H,
with mean y and standard deviation  .
To calculate the expected payoﬀ for an individual agent i, one needs to
specify its conjecture about the positions taken by the rest of the market.
Consider the two extreme conjectures, which will be the relevant ones in
equilibrium. The ﬁrst is that all agents other than iattack the currency. Con-
ditional on     1, the expected payoﬀ from attacking for i can be written as




   – t.
If the public signal is such that this expected payoﬀ is nonnegative, it is op-
timal for i to speculate against the currency. Since all agents are identical,
this must be true for everyone in the economy: when the above expression is
nonnegative,     1 is an equilibrium.
The second conjecture is that no one attacks. Conditional on     0, the
expected payoﬀ from attacking is:




   – t.
As before, if the public signal is such that the individual expected payoﬀ is
negative, it is optimal for inot to attack the currency. As all agents are iden-
tical,     0 is an equilibrium. Note that equation (3) is larger than equation
(4): Individual payoﬀs are strategic complements. That is, given the signal
y, they are increasing in the action taken by other agents in the economy.
For the sake of comparison with the global-game model discussed below,
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5. This implies Pr(η   x)   Pr(η≥–x)   H(x).we now rearrange equations (3) and (4) to describe the optimal behavior by
individual speculators in terms of “trigger strategies.” Note that, condi-
tional on everyone else attacking, the maximum value of the public signal
at which an agent optimally chooses to attack is
(5) y∗   1 –  H–1(t).
Conditional on   1, the optimal strategy pursued by any individual agent
is to attack if and only if y y∗. By the same token, if everyone else refrains




∗   0 –  H–1(t).
Thus, conditional on     0, an agent refrains from speculation if and only
if y   y
 
∗.
Now, either threshold is a rational-expectations equilibrium. However,
what determines the choice of one threshold over the other is not explained
by the model. Simply, it is assumed that exogenous uncertainty—the same
for all individuals—drives the threshold selection. Note that, because y∗  
y
 
∗, the model predicts that an attack will occur for certain (irrespective of
which equilibrium threshold is selected) if y   y
 
∗, but it will never occur if
y   y∗. In the ﬁrst case, the signal about fundamentals is so bad that each
individual’s expected payoﬀfrom attacking is nonnegative regardless of the
action taken by the rest of the market: everyone attacks the currency. In the
second case, the expected payoﬀis negative even if everyone else attacks the
currency: no one speculates.
When the public signal is in the range y
 
∗   y   y∗, the economy may or
may not be hit by a speculative run on the currency, depending on which
threshold is chosen by the speculators.6 Note that for it is rational for each
individual to participate in the attack only if everyone else attacks the cur-
rency. As all agents choose the same threshold, this model assumes com-
mon knowledge not only of the public signal on the fundamentals but also
of the actions undertaken by every individual in the market. This means
that, in equilibrium, each individual must somehow know that all the other
agents have simultaneously chosen to attack.
Large Traders in Models with Symmetric Information
We now recast the model to allow for a large trader. The presence of a
large trader does not aﬀect the upper threshold, y∗, corresponding to an
equilibrium in which all agents attack the currency. What doeschange is the
lower threshold, y
 
∗. When the signal on the fundamentals is positive but
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6. We should note here that a speculative attack by the entire market does not necessarily co-
incide ex post with a collapse of the currency, as this only occurs if the ex post value of the fun-
damentals   is smaller than 1.weak, the speculative ﬁrepower of a large investor may be suﬃcient to force
a devaluation, even if no small agent participates in the attack. The expres-
sion for the lower threshold equation (6) is therefore replaced by
(7) y
 
∗( )     –  H–1(t).
Thus, the larger the trader’s size  , the larger the range of public signals that
trigger an attack and the lower the range of signals over which an attack
may or may not occur. The conclusion from this model is straightforward.
The presence of a large trader increases the vulnerability of a peg, as this
trader trivially solves the “coordination problem” in a speculative attack for
signals in the interval between 0 and  .
Although in this benchmark model we cannot analyze the eﬀects of vary-
ing the relative precision of the large trader’s information (the signal is the
same for every agent), we can nonetheless derive an important result by
varying the precision of the public signal. From equations (5) and (7), it is
apparent that (if t is relatively small, i.e., t   1/2) both thresholds y
 
∗( ) and
y∗ are increasing in  . Higher uncertainty—say, a mean-preserving spread
of the distribution of the public signal—leads all agents to raise the trigger
for an attack, regardless of the equilibrium on which agents coordinate.
In equilibrium, small traders always take the same side of the market as
the large one. To avoid misunderstandings of this model, we stress that this
does not imply that the large trader has signalling ability or represents a fo-
cal point. For y y
 
∗( ), the currency is expected to collapse even if no small
trader attacks the currency. For y
 
∗( )   y   y∗, the presence of a large
trader makes no diﬀerence; in this region, an attack by a large trader does
not represent a focal point, at least no more so than any other event relevant
to the coordination of agents’ expectations on a particular equilibrium.
This is not to deny that signalling and focal points may be relevant in equi-
librium selection. However, these elements require a diﬀerent approach,
possibly loosening the assumption of common knowledge about the fun-
damentals.
5.2.3 Models with Asymmetric Information
We now turn to a class of coordination games according to which in-
complete information is the key element of a theory of speculative behavior.
The approach in this section is based on the mechanism of equilibrium se-
lection ﬁrst analyzed by Carlsson and van Damme (1993) for the case of two
agents, then in a series of papers by Morris and Shin for a continuum of
agents, including a contribution to the theory of currency crises (Morris
and Shin 1998). Building on this approach, Corsetti et al. (2000) have pro-
vided a comprehensive theory of the role of large traders in a currency cri-
sis. The analysis in this subsection discusses this contribution in detail.
The main feature of the global-games approach to speculative crises is
that agents do not share information about the fundamentals of the econ-
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the private signals becomes very small, individual information about the
fundamentals never becomes common knowledge among traders. In other
words, upon receiving its own signal, the representative trader can only
guess the signals reaching the other traders, as well as their conjectures
about each other’s information and guesses. It cannot, however, count on
the other traders to know its information and conjectures—each agent
forms its beliefs based exclusively on its own information. This departure
from the assumption of common knowledge of the signal is crucial for the
results that follow.
The Global-Games Approach to Currency Speculation
Once again, we start by abstracting from the presence of a large trader
(i.e.,   0). As in the previous section, agents have a uniform ignorance
prior over  ; however, here there is no public signal to all agents. Rather,
each small trader in the continuum receives a private signal,
(8) xi      εi   0,
where the distribution of εi is smooth and symmetric (we let F denote the
cumulative distribution function). Although there is no public information
about  , the distribution of the fundamentals  as well as of signals xiis com-
mon knowledge.7
Conjecture that, as before, all agents (optimally) follow a trigger strategy:
they attack if and only if their signal is below some optimally selected
threshold x∗; otherwise, they refrain from attacking. As noise is indepen-
dent of the fundamentals, the expected mass of agents attacking the cur-
rency is equal to the probability that any particular agent receives a signal
below x∗. Thus, for a given x∗, the population of agents attacking the cur-
rency at   will be
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7. To understand the logic of the model in the absence of common knowledge of the signal,
it is useful to look at an example in which the noise in the private signal is distributed uniformly
with a bounded support of size    around the realization of  . Agent i knows that the funda-
mentals are distributed in an interval of size   on each side of xi, that is,   ∈ [xi –  , xi    ]. As
the realization of   may fall on an extreme of this interval, agent i cannot exclude that the sig-
nal of agent j is equal to xi   xi   2 . However, if agent j receives a signal as far as 2  from xi,
j concludes that   is in an interval of size 2  around xi   2  and, most importantly, cannot ex-
clude that agent i’s signal xi is 4  distant from its actual position. Iterating once more the ar-
gument above, we see that agent i cannot exclude that agent j believes that agent i’s own beliefs
about agent j’s signal are as far as 6 from xi, and so on. Note the paradox in this result. Agent
i is 100 percent sure that   is  -close to i’s own signal. Agent i also knows that all other agents
get a signal within an interval of 2 . However, the fact that agents do not have common infor-
mation useful to locate the position of the fundamentals makes them worry about the possi-
bility that their opponents’ beliefs about fundamentals and signals wander quite far away from
where the fundamentals and the signals actually are.Now, we know that a crisis occurs when   is at least as large as  , that is,
when




      .
Thus, the maximum value of the fundamentals at which a crisis materializes
must satisfy




      ∗.
This means that, given x∗, the peg collapses for any realization of the fun-
damentals below  ∗ and survives otherwise.
Next, if agents expect the currency to collapse for any     ∗, the ex-
pected proﬁt from an attack—conditional on receiving the signal xi—is
(12) (1 – t)Pr(    ∗ | xi) – tPr(    ∗ | xi)   F  
 ∗
 
– xi    – t.
Because agents attack if and only if their expected proﬁt is nonnegative, the
minimum value of the signal xi at which they attack, x∗, satisﬁes




   – t   0.
Thus, given  ∗, agents optimally choose to attack upon receiving a private
signal smaller or equal to x∗ as deﬁned above.
The equations (11) and (13) represent a system of two equations in two
unknowns (x∗ and  ∗) that completely characterize the equilibrium of the
model.8 Solving this system, it is easy to see that the equilibrium in trigger
strategies is unique. From equation (13) above, accounting for the symme-
try of the signal, it follows that




     t.
Comparing equations (13) and (14), the threshold value for the fundamen-
tal is
(15)  ∗   1 – t.
Note that 1 – tis also the proportion of agents attacking the currency at   
 ∗. Using this result in equation (11) yields a closed-form solution for the
individual threshold:
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8. The system above is a Bayes-Nash equilibrium. According to the standard deﬁnitions, a
strategy for an agent is a rule that prescribes an action for each realization of the agent’s private
signal. A proﬁle of strategies (one for each agent) is an equilibrium if, conditional on the in-
formation available to each agent i, and given the strategies followed by other agents, the ac-
tion prescribed by the strategy followed by agent i maximizes the conditional expected payoﬀ
(utility).(16) x∗    ∗ –  F –1(t)   1 – t –  F –1(t).
Note that, if we let the noise in the private signal go to zero, the trigger
point tends to the threshold value for the fundamental: x∗ →  ∗. As agents
become more conﬁdent about the information content of their signal, the
level of the optimal trigger tends to coincide with the threshold value  ∗. A
well-known feature of this model is that not only is its trigger-strategies
equilibrium unique, but agents also optimally select the trigger strategy
characterized above over any other possible strategy. The proof of unique-
ness can be found in Morris and Shin (2000).9
Large Traders in Models with Asymmetric Information
A large trader of size   is now introduced in the economy. The small
traders keep receiving private signals xi with the properties stated above,
and the large trader receives a private signal denoted by xl:
(17) xl      lεl  l   0
where the distribution of εl is smooth and symmetric (we write L for the cu-
mulative distribution). Notably,  l can and will diﬀer from  . In other
words, the precision of the signal of the large trader (which is the inverse of
the variance of the signal  l
2) can diﬀer from the precision of the signal of a
typical small trader.
This is a realistic feature of the model. On the one hand, as argued in the
introduction, it is widely believed that large traders tend to have access to
superior information. On the other hand, even if large traders are better in-
formed on average, under some circumstances the ranking of information
may favor small traders. It is therefore useful to analyze both cases. In the
model, it is assumed that all agents in the market are aware of their relative
information precision; that is, the distribution of the signals, including the
relative size of   and  l, is common knowledge.
To derive the equilibrium, conjecture again that all players play trigger
strategies.10 From the previous subsection, we know that the mass of small
traders attacking the currency is equal to the probability that any particu-
lar agent receives a signal below some optimal trigger x∗, as in equation (9).
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9. Two points are worth noticing. First, the equilibrium is unique in the sense that agents
choose a unique threshold for their signal. With a continuum of agents there is no aggregate
uncertainty, so there is also a unique level of the fundamentals that triggers a crisis. In equilib-
rium, however, agents may and will choose diﬀerent actions depending on the speciﬁc realiza-
tions of their signals. In other words, there will be heterogeneity in the behavior of investors—
to be contrasted with the strong result in common-knowledge, multiple-equilibrium models in
which everybody takes the same action in equilibrium. Second, the structure of information is
crucial to uniqueness. As shown by Morris and Shin (2000), were agents to receive both a
private and a public signal, there would be some threshold for the relative precision of these
two signals beyond which the equilibrium in trigger strategies is no longer unique—despite the
presence of private information, we are back to the case discussed in the previous section.
10. We refer to Corsetti et al. (2000) for proof that trigger strategies would be optimally se-
lected even if agents were allowed to choose other types of strategies.Now, the small traders amount to a percentage 1 –   of the market. Thus,
the condition for a crisis to occur as a result of an attack exclusively by the
small traders is equivalent to equation (10) rescaled by 1 –  :




   ≥  ,
and the value of the fundamentals below which the currency collapses sat-
isﬁes
(19) (1 –  )F  
x∗
 
–            .
If the large trader attacks the currency as well, the ﬁnancial resources mo-
bilized by speculators on the left-hand side of equation (18) are increased
by  . Following the same steps as above, consider the level of fundamentals
   that solves
(20) λ   (1 – λ)F  
x∗
 
–    
       .
Obviously it is        . When the fundamentals are below    , the currency col-
lapses whether or not the large trader attacks. When the fundamentals are
between     and    , the peg collapses if and only if all traders, small and large,
speculate against the currency. To sum up, with a large trader we have two
thresholds for the fundamentals (   and    ) instead of a single one ( ∗). Note
that the distance between the two is not equal to  .
Next, consider the expected payoﬀ of the large trader. This agent knows
that, if it attacks, the currency will collapse for any      . Clearly, it chooses
to attack as long as the expected proﬁt conditional on its signal is nonneg-
ative, that is, as long as
(21) (1 – t)Pr(     | xl) – tPr(     | xl)   L  




xl    – t   0.
The highest value of the signal at which it attacks—that is, its trigger, xl
∗—
thus solves
(22) L  
    –
  l
xl ∗
     t.
To evaluate the expected payoﬀ of the typical small trader is not as easy.
Small traders know that the currency will certainly collapse for any realiza-
tion of the fundamentals worse than    . When   is between     and    , a col-
lapse will only occur if the large player participates in the attack—that is, if
and only if the large trader receives a signal worse than xl∗. The expected
proﬁt from an attack conditional on the signal xi must therefore be written
in such a way as to keep these diﬀerent regions of the fundamentals sepa-
rated from each other.
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The expected payoﬀ to attack conditional on signal xi is therefore11
(24) Pr(      | xi)   Pr(          , xl   xl∗ | xi) – t 
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The analysis of the model can be considerably simpliﬁed with a change of
variables, using the following deﬁnitions:
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It can be shown that both     and    are monotonically decreasing in x∗. The
threshold for the large player (x∗
l in equation [22]) can now be written as
(26) xl∗   x∗       –   lL–1(t)
while the optimal threshold for the small players, x∗, is the unique solution
to the following equation:
(27) F( 
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 (   – z) – L–1(t) dz – t   0.
Once x∗ is determined,12 the large trader’s switching point, xl∗, and the two
thresholds for the fundamentals are also uniquely determined.
Does a Large Trader Increase Financial Fragility? 
The Role of Size and Information Precision
In contrast to the model with small traders only, the model with a large
player has no closed-form solution. However, the key results can be ana-
lyzed by focusing on its limiting properties—that is, by letting agents be-
come arbitrarily well informed about the fundamentals.
Consider the case in which the information of the large trader is arbi-
trarily more precise than the information of the rest of the market, that is,
lim  / l   ∞. Evaluating equation (27) under this maintained assumption,
we observe that for any      (that is, for any z      ) the probability that a
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11. Note that this expression requires the signal of the large trader to be independent from
the signal of a typical small trader.
12. Observe that the function on the left-hand side of equation (27) is continuous and strictly
increasing in both     and    , variables that are in turn continuous and strictly decreasing func-
tions of x∗. Also note that the left-hand side of equation (27) is positive for suﬃciently small
x∗, while it becomes negative for suﬃciently large x∗. Thus, there is a unique x∗ solving equa-
tion (27).precisely informed large trader chooses to attack is equal to 1. We can thus
write:
(28) F(   )    
   
   
f(z)dz   F(   )   t.
This expression has a simple interpretation. If in the limit the noise in the
large trader’s signal is zero, small traders need simply guess the position of
the fundamentals, thereby forming their best estimate of the signal to the
large trader. Intuitively, a large trader with extremely precise information
does not add any noise to the estimation problem of small traders: they need
not worry about the large trader’s errors.
To solution of the model is then
(29)       (1 –  )F(–   ) →   (1 –  )(1 – t)
x∗ →    –  F –1(t)
xl∗     –   lL–1(t).
These expressions establish a ﬁrst important result. In equilibrium,    , xl∗
and x∗ are increasing in the size of the large player,  . A larger   makes the
large and the small traders more aggressive, in the sense that they optimally
choose to attack for higher values of their signals. In particular, since      1
– t    ∗, relative to the benchmark with small traders only, the presence of
a large, well-informed trader increases the fragility of the market by making
small traders willing to attack the currency for stronger fundamentals.13
What if the information of the large trader is less precise than that of the
small players? Will the size of the large trader still aﬀect the fragility of the
market (despite inferior information)? Interestingly, the answer is a quali-
ﬁed yes. Referring to Corsetti et al. (2000) for details, when lim  /  l   0 the
inﬂuence of an uninformed large trader on the small traders’ strategies is ei-
ther null or moderate, depending on the size of  . If  is small enough, vary-
ing   does not aﬀect the equilibrium strategy of small traders: Intuitively,
the noisy behavior of the large trader is oﬀset, in equilibrium, by the net po-
sitions taken by the bulk of the market. If  is large enough, the “erratic” be-
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13. A heuristic argument can help to clarify the latter point. As we observed in the ﬁrst part
of section 5.2.3, without a large trader (  0) the threshold for an attack by small traders only
is equal to 1 – t. This means that, at   1 – t, a proportion of 1 – t of traders attacks the cur-
rency. Now, suppose that each small trader has a share  of resources taken away, and that this
share is given to a single large trader with arbitrarily precise information. At   1 – t, the
amount of resources thrown into the market by small traders falls from 1 – t to (1 – t)(1 –  ).
However, at   1 – t, because of her arbitrarily precise information, the large trader will al-
ways attack the currency, using the full amount of the resources given to it. Thus, the overall
amount of resources in the market increases from 1 – t to   (1 – t)(1 –  ), so that 1 – t can no
longer be the threshold of the fundamentals at which the currency collapses. However, this
means that, in the presence of a large trader, the region of the fundamentals where the currency
is expected to collapse becomes wider, and small agents are willing to follow a more aggressive
trading strategy.havior of the large trader cannot be oﬀset by the rest of the market. Its pres-
ence still makes all traders more aggressive, but to a lesser extent than in the
case discussed above.
We can now draw our main conclusions from this model by stressing two
key elements for a theory of speculative attacks with large traders. The ﬁrst
element is size. In the model,   is positively related to the small traders’ ex-
pected payoﬀ, through its inﬂuence on the region of fundamentals in which
a collapse of the currency is possible. As the upper bound of this region,    ,
is increasing in  , speculative attacks can be successful for stronger funda-
mentals. Consistently, the threshold x∗—that is, the maximum estimated
value of the fundamentals at which small traders are willing to attack the
currency—is also increasing (in some limit cases nondecreasing) in  .
The second element is the relative precision of information, as indexed by
the ratio  /  l. For a given  , a high degree of large trader’s information ac-
curacy (i.e., an arbitrarily small  l) reduces the uncertainty about the be-
havior of the large player itself and increases the expected payoﬀ of the
small agents for any given signal. Small traders thus become more aggres-
sive in the market (i.e., they attack at a higher threshold x∗). Interestingly,
a large player with relatively low precision of information can still exert
some inﬂuence on market participants’ behavior, but the extent of its inﬂu-
ence is much lower.
Note the diﬀerence between the prediction of this model and the main
conclusion of the model with multiple equilibria. In the latter model, a large
trader increases the vulnerability of a peg independently of the behavior of
small traders—recall that the presence of a large trader only aﬀects the
lower threshold y
 
∗ of the signal, increasing it by an amount equal to the
trader’s size. However, for signals in the upper end of the region of multiple
equilibria, the large trader makes no diﬀerence. In the global-games model,
however, the impact of a large player on the market outcome depends cru-
cially on her inﬂuence on the behavior of small traders. Moreover, the large
player makes a diﬀerence for strong fundamentals: It is the upper threshold
   that is increasing in  as, for a bigger  , both the large and the small traders
bet against the currency for stronger values of their signals xl∗ and x∗.
Thus, although multiple equilibrium models shed light on the eﬀects of a
large trader when fundamentals are relatively weak, the global-games
model shows that the presence of a large trader may make a diﬀerence in
economies with relatively strong fundamentals. Together, these two classes
of models show that, in some circumstances, pegs that may not (or would
not) collapse in the absence of a large trader may well be expected to crum-
ble if one big elephant steps into a small pond.
Signalling and Herding
An important lesson from the above model is that a large trader can in-
crease the fragility of a peg even when the market can at best guess the large
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ﬂuences the equilibrium portfolio strategies in the market as a whole, espe-
cially when the large trader has more precise information. We may reason-
ably expect this inﬂuence to increase further if the large trader is given the
opportunity to let the market learn its positions or information.
Consider the following problem of dynamic coordination with learn-
ing—an example that can be framed in a modiﬁed version of the above
model.14 After receiving their signals about the state of the fundamentals,
both the large and the small traders can now choose between moving ﬁrst
or waiting one period before taking a speculative position in the foreign ex-
change market. The state of the economy   is revealed after all agents have
built up their positions, and the payoﬀs are independent of the timing of the
move, so that there are no costs to waiting. Late movers can observe the
trading ﬂow generated by early movers, raising the possibility of signalling
(by assumption, there is no other form of communication).
Should small traders move ﬁrst? To the extent that their size is inﬁnitesi-
mal, small traders’ individual positions do not inﬂuence trading ﬂows in
any appreciable way. As each small trader ignores the impact of its own ac-
tion on the market, it cannot hope to aﬀect the market by moving ﬁrst.
However, small traders may obtain some informational beneﬁt by waiting.
Thus, it can be concluded that small traders will weakly prefer to be late
movers. It is plausible to assume that, if indiﬀerent whether to be early or
late movers, small traders will move late.
Now, since the large trader knows that small traders have no reason to
move early, it will never learn anything by waiting. Still, its portfolio posi-
tion cannot be ignored by the market. Instead, by letting people know its
portfolio position, it may increase the probability that its strategy will be
successful. Thus, a large trader weakly prefers to move early. Once again, it
is plausible to assume that, if indiﬀerent about the timing of the move, the
large trader will move early.15
From here on, the analysis follows the same steps outlined in the previous
subsection, but with an important qualiﬁcation: Now the decision taken by
small traders is conditional on the action taken by the large trader. Conjec-
ture that the large trader chooses to attack only if its signal is lower than xl∗,
where, as in equation (22), this threshold is deﬁned by
(30) Pr(     | xl   xl∗)   t
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14. We draw once again on Corsetti et al. (2000). The example comes from a class of models
discussed in Dasgupta (2001).
15. A large trader’s incentive to move ﬁrst is strong when its estimate of the fundamentals is
not too good or too bad, leading it to believe that an attack will be successful only if many small
traders join. Conversely, if the private signal xlis bad enough, the large trader may expect a cur-
rency collapse regardless of speculation by small traders. In this case, as there is no cost in wait-
ing, the large trader will be indiﬀerent whether to attack early or late (the same consideration
applies for signals xl that are suﬃciently good).If the large trader does not attack, its inaction signals that, based on its own
information, it ﬁnds the economy to be strong (that is, xl   xl∗). However,
those small traders that receive a bad signal about the fundamentals may
nonetheless choose to attack the currency, thinking that enough small
traders will join the attack and cause a collapse. Consequently, there will be
an optimal threshold x
 
∗, below which small traders attack the currency
even when the large trader has not taken a speculative position against it.
This optimal threshold is deﬁned by
(31) Pr(      | xl   xl∗, xi   x∗)   t
if a ﬁnite solution to this equation exists. Otherwise, if the left-hand side of
the above equation is strictly larger (smaller) than the right-hand side, x
 
∗ is
set equal to    (– ).
Of course, when the large trader attacks the currency, it signals to the
small traders a quite diﬀerent assessment of the strength of the economic
fundamentals (as xl   xl∗). Relative to the previous case, small traders are
willing to attack for a wider range of signals they receive. The optimal trig-
ger conditional on an attack by the large trader, denoted x  ∗, is deﬁned by
(32) Pr(     | xl   xl∗, xi   x  ∗)   t
if a ﬁnite solution to this equation exists. Otherwise, x  ∗ is set equal to   
or – , depending on whether the left-hand side of the above equation is
larger or small than the right-hand side.
Through its inﬂuence on the trigger strategies of small traders, the large
investor induces some herding in the market; for a given distribution of
private signals, its position aﬀects the number of agents taking the same side
of the market. The extent of herding will depend on the equilibrium value
of the two thresholds above. If these are not ﬁnite, there will be a stronger
form of herding: the position of the large trader will determine the position
of all other agents in the market.16
To illustrate this point, suppose the signal of the large trader is arbitrar-
ily precise relative to the signals received by the rest of the market. In this
case there are no ﬁnite solutions for the triggers of small traders, but x  
∗  
–  and x  ∗      , while     and    converge to 0 and 1, respectively. In equi-
librium, a large trader with superior information eﬀectively leads the pack
of the small traders with no defection: each small agent ignores its own
private signal and always takes the same side of the market as the large
trader (we return to this in the next section).17
In the limiting case  /  l→∞, herding does not depend on the size  of the
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16. The thresholds of the fundamentals below which the currency collapses solve (1 –  )Pr[xi
  x∗       ]      if the large trader has not attacked the currency, and   (1 –  )Pr[xi  
x  ∗    θ  ]   θ  otherwise.
17. See Dasgupta (1999) for a theoretical discussion of herding in coordination games.large investor. As long as   0, even a relatively small player can have the
strongest impact as long as the market regards its information as arbitrar-
ily precise. That is to say, the only dimension in which size is important is
the signalling ability associated with it, that is, the fact that the market does
not ignore the inﬂuence of its actions on the equilibrium outcome.
Size makes a diﬀerence, however, when the large trader’s information is
less than arbitrarily precise, and becomes very important if the ranking of
information precision tilts in favor of small players. To see this, suppose that
a large player without precise information gets a relatively bad signal on the
fundamentals. By moving ﬁrst and attacking the currency, it cannot hope to
aﬀect signiﬁcantly the beliefs of the other agents, which know that its infor-
mation is relatively inaccurate. Yet, by moving ﬁrst, the large trader can re-
duce the small traders’ uncertainty about its action in equilibrium. Small
agents will decide their optimal behavior knowing it has (or has not) thrown
its resources on the market. If it attacks, for a larger  , a smaller resource
gap remains to be ﬁlled for a speculative attack to be successful.
To summarize, the dynamic eﬀects of a large trader are related bothto in-
formation about the fundamentals and to the size of resources already de-
voted to an attack. In the limiting case (the information of the large trader
is extremely accurate), the ﬁrst factor overshadows the second. However,
for some lower degree of precision of information, we may expect the sec-
ond factor to dominate.
5.2.4 Open Issues
Do Large Players Destabilize Markets?
In the long-standing academic and policy debate on whether speculation
is destabilizing, the role of large players is a particularly hot item. One view
is that large traders and arbitrageurs able to collect and process superior in-
formation improve the eﬃciency of the price mechanism. Also, because of
their ability and willingness to take leveraged positions, HLIs can be an im-
portant source of market liquidity. The alternative view emphasizes their
role as catalysts of market panic and short-termism. The literature provides
many example in which market eﬃciency is jeopardized by the behavior of
noisy traders even when they are atomistic, let alone when the size of their
speculative positions make them primary suspects as market “agitators.”
Indeed, an oft-voiced concern is that the presence of large players may
not lead only to short-term, high-frequency excess volatility of exchange
rates and other asset prices, but also to persistent and destabilizing devia-
tions of asset prices from their equilibrium values, with negative eﬀects on
real economic activity. This is the case, for instance, if the actions of large
players can trigger currency crises that would not have otherwise occurred,
or force monetary authorities to prevent a currency collapse at the cost of
hiking interest rates and halting growth.
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scription. Some have argued, however, that Hong Kong in 1998 was the
nearest case of an economy whose fundamentals were generally sound, in
spite of some macro weaknesses, but that came close to the collapse of its
currency board regime as a result of aggressive speculation against its forex
and stock markets. In this example, only a controversial direct intervention
of the authorities in the equity market prevented a break of the peg and fur-
ther sharp falls in its equity market (see section 5.3.3). However, the eﬀects
of defending the peg with high interest rates, likely exacerbating the reces-
sionary eﬀects of the Asian crisis on the domestic economy, were quite
costly. While it remains controversial to assess whether the actions of large
players have a destabilizing impact (and counterfactuals are hard to assess
when fundamentals interact with complex market dynamics), the welfare
costs of potential destabilization have been a matter of concern for policy
makers in small and medium-sized economies.
In the models discussed above, the mere presence of a large trader makes
all other agents more aggressive and ready to bail out for stronger values
of the fundamentals. Although the analysis does not explicitly address
welfare issues, it is compatible with models in which the economy ends up
being worse oﬀ after a currency collapse. We should note that the above
analysis rests on the key assumption that the large trader profits in the
event of a devaluation. This may not always be the case. As large traders
take speculative positions in many diﬀerent markets, it is plausible that,
under some circumstances, they may actually lose because of currency in-
stability. To mention but one example, in 1998 several large financial insti-
tutions were reportedly long in Russian assets. Given the size of their port-
folios and the relative thinness of the market for such assets, a precipitous
unwinding of long positions would have exposed these institutions to
heavy losses. Attempts to hedge these positions through forward pur-
chases were thwarted when the fall of the ruble led counterparts to default
on their contracts.
This example suggests that, in some situations, large traders may well pre-
fer exchange rate stability to a devaluation. To analyze this case in the the-
oretical model presented in this section, one needs to allow for a more gen-
eral payoﬀ function, reﬂecting the initial portfolio positions of large
players. In this case the presence of a large trader may end up making small
players less (instead of more) aggressive in the currency market, thus re-
ducing the likelihood of speculative attacks and sharp currency devalua-
tions.
Do Large Players Have Substantial Market Impact?
One may claim that the estimated total size of large players’ activity (say,
HFs’ net currency positions) is too small, relative to the depth of the forex
market and the amount of international reserves available to the govern-
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that large players have access to superior information, the model presented
above suggests that even modest short positions by HFs may lead a large
number of other investors to herd. As many investors mirror the behavior
of large funds, the overall buildup of short positions against a currency is a
multiple of the cumulative positions of these funds—indeed, large enough
to trigger a currency crisis.
In this respect, the FSF (2000) study suggests that, in the 1990s, some macro
HFs had built a very strong reputation in terms of information precision and
ability to forecast macro developments. In addition, anecdotal evidence sug-
gests that many ﬁnancial institutions stood ready to provide credit to HFs as
well as services in executing forex trade, at least in part as a way to track the
investment strategy of these funds. Information about what HFs were doing
was indeed considered a valuable asset by a wide range of investors.
We should note here that small agents may try to infer the action by in-
formed large traders even when they do not have information about order
volumes. Under the plausible assumption that large trades tend to aﬀect
prices, small agents without knowledge of order volumes can exploit the in-
formation implicit in price movements by buying when prices are rising and
selling when prices are falling. In other words, price changes are interpreted
as signals that large players are buying or selling. This case for positive feed-
back strategies, however, crucially depends on the degree of asymmetric in-
formation in the market. One may think that strong asymmetries are not
likely in foreign exchange markets, because the information about macro-
economic variables is mostly public. However, in the case of emerging mar-
kets, certain players with privileged access to policy makers are usually be-
lieved to have better information than average market participants, as well
as superior skills in analyzing public data.
Two factors play a key role here: leverage capacity and overall market liq-
uidity. As regards the ﬁrst factor, some players, such as HFs, are less re-
stricted than others (such as institutional investors) in taking large lever-
aged positions. In a speculative attack, these agents could mobilize massive
resources up to a multiple of their capital base.
As regards market liquidity, the evidence suggests that forex liquidity
drops signiﬁcantly in periods of turmoil (see FSF 2000). Thus, while the
overall cumulative short position by HFs may be small relative to the depth
and liquidity of the market in normal times, its relative size may increase
signiﬁcantly when market liquidity shrinks during crisis periods. This eﬀect
is particularly strong under institutionalized ﬁxed exchange rate regimes
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18. Note that another large player in any forex market dynamics is the monetary authority,
which may aﬀect currency values through its intervention in the forex market. What usually
distinguishes monetary authorities from other large players is the objective function: maxi-
mization of the country’s welfare function for the former, and proﬁt maximization for the lat-
ter. However, in some episodes, even monetary authorities in emerging economies have al-
legedly engaged in currency trading for balance-sheet purposes.such as currency boards, because these regimes limit the overall degree of
liquidity in the ﬁnancial system. Even medium-sized sales of domestic cur-
rency to purchase foreign currency can dry up liquidity very quickly, lead-
ing to interest rate spikes such as the ones in Hong Kong in 1998 and in
Turkey and Argentina in late 2000. It should be stressed that a drying-up of
liquidity is an endogenous feature of an equilibrium with speculative at-
tacks. In the model above, for instance, it is an implication of the herding re-
sult, as the speculative position by a large informed agent makes all agents
take the same side of the market.
Do Large Players Intentionally Foster Herding?
The above theoretical analysis vindicates the view that large players can
eﬀectively behave like market leaders by signaling their investment strate-
gies (“talking one’s book”), driving a large number of traders toward short-
ing a particular currency or asset market. Nonetheless, this result by no
means implies that herding is alwaysin the interest of large players, nor that
we should expect them to engage systematically in signalling games, reveal-
ing their positions and information to the rest of the market. In fact, major
market participants may well try to prevent herding while they build (or un-
wind) their short positions. It is only when positions have been built that
herding by other agents (taking short positions or selling the currency out-
right) may become advantageous, as a way to increase the pressure on the
exchange rate and push a currency peg to break.
Suppose a large player is planning to short a currency or an equity index
in expectation of a future fall in prices warranted by weakening fundamen-
tals. In order to minimize any eﬀect from its trading on current prices, its
preference would be to build its positions secretly. The same consideration
applies to the case of a large player that is trying to unwind its short posi-
tions, because herding would generate adverse upward pressures on prices.
Actually, if anything, a large player that is shorting an asset or unwinding a
short position may prefer the other agents to take a contrarian trading po-
sition, so as to minimize price movements.
In other words, when building a position, a large player has a clear interest
in trading at prices that do not reﬂect its private information. Only afterit has
built up its position does its beneﬁt if its information becomes public, as prices
would then move in the desired direction. At that point, there is a clear incen-
tive to engage in signaling, as analyzed in the period model presented above.19
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19. This issue is in part debated in the literature on optimal trading strategy. In the model by
Easley and O’Hara (1987), for instance, large trading size signals that some informed agent is
trading on the basis of superior information. These authors argue that an investor trading on
superior information will nonetheless prefer to take large positions at any given prices. The al-
ternative view, presented by Barclay and Warner (1993), is that informed traders do not want
to let the market learn their information by observing their position. Thus they engage in
“stealth trading,” for instance, by placing multiple medium-size orders). Of course, the reac-
tion by small players will crucially depend on which trades (large or small) they perceive to be
more informative; see Lee, Lin, and Liu (1999) for a discussion of this issue.We note here that the goal of building a speculative position without
moving prices is helped by the presence of public authorities committed to
stabilizing prices—as is the case in a ﬁxed exchange rate regime. It is still
true that early herding may be bad news for speculators: Early speculative
pressure on the currency may translate into higher interest rates and for-
ward prices, raising the costs of shorting positions in that currency. Thus,
there are still advantages to keeping early moves secret. However, price sta-
bilizing schemes, such as ﬁxed rate regimes, usually lead domestic authori-
ties to provide a large amount of liquidity at current prices. Under a ﬂexible
exchange rate regime, instead, attempts to build large short positions with-
out aﬀecting prices require other investors to take the other side of the mar-
ket (playing contrarian and being long) as monetary authorities are not
committed to providing foreign currency at a ﬁxed price. Again, only once
such positions have been taken does noisy signalling become proﬁtable by
pushing exchange rates down.
Do Large Players Inhibit Contrarian Trade?
In the model discussed under “Signalling and Herding” in section 5.2.3,
strong herding only occurs in the limiting case when the large trader is ar-
bitrarily better informed than the rest of the market. Otherwise, there will
always be some agents who are willing to take contrarian trading positions
based on their own beliefs about the sustainability of the existing regime. It
is worth stressing that small agents do not necessarily lose when taking long
positions in the currency against the large one. Even when the large trader
has superior information, its private information may not reﬂect the true
state of the economy.
Indeed, there is circumstantial evidence that, on a number of occasions
during the 1997–99 period, some HFs experienced heavy losses as the ma-
jority of market investors traded against them. In some episodes, the losses
followed HFs’ attempts to bet on exchange rate stability or appreciation by
taking long positions on currencies under speculative pressure (such as the
alleged long positions by some large funds on the Indonesian rupiah in the
winter of 1997). Clearly, it is possible that large investors engage in strategic
games against each other. If so, diﬀerences in information and beliefs about
the evolution of fundamentals in a market would play a much larger role
than a stylized theoretical model with only one large trader and a mass of
small traders may suggest.
Still, one cannot rule out the possibility that, despite diﬀerences in infor-
mation and opinions, the size and reputation of large players taking aggres-
sive positions in the market may, at times, drive out contrarian investors. As
compared with the usually high leverage capacity of hedge and investment
funds, for instance, risk aversion and credit constraints may eﬀectively limit
the amount of stabilizing speculation that individuals and other institutions
can provide. In other words, in a speculative attack against a currency, small
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trarian trading, even if they believe that fundamentals do not warrant a de-
valuation. Paradoxically, these investors may end up taking the same short
positions as the large institutions initiating the attack.
While plausible and realistic, these conjectures should nonetheless be an-
alyzed systematically in models of speculative attacks explicitly allowing for
credit constraint and risk aversion. Diﬀerences in leverage and attitude to-
ward risk need not mechanically imply that small investors stay on the side-
line or follow a large player in a lemminglike fashion.
The theory of speculative attacks with large traders should also be devel-
oped so as to explain, rather than assume, diﬀerences in the size of the spec-
ulative positions taken by economic agents. When trading size is endoge-
nous, individual agents know that choosing a large position helps solve the
coordination problem inherent in a speculative attack—for the reasons dis-
cussed above, the chances of success are increasing in the magnitude of
speculation. However, agents choosing a large speculative position also
have more at stake. A risk-averse agent’s marginal willingness to speculate
can decrease rapidly as its open position grows. There are therefore two
contrasting forces shaping the optimal speculative behavior of investors,
one suggesting larger, the other smaller portfolio positions.
In general, herding phenomena result from the complex and, at times,
unpredictable interaction of decisions of a large number of players, both
small and large. Whether domestic and foreign investors herd, whether do-
mestic investors herd more or less than foreign ones, whether oﬀshore (and
highly leveraged) foreign investors herd more or less than onshore foreign
investors, and whether larger investors are leaders of the pack are all em-
pirical questions that must be addressed in case studies.
Can Large Players Manipulate Markets?
The basic question addressed by the literature on market manipulation is
whether it is possible for a trader to buy an asset, drive the price up, and then
sell the asset at this inﬂated price, thereby earning a proﬁt (see, e.g., Kyle
1984; Vila 1987, 1989; Jarrow 1989; Bagnoli and Lipman 1998; Benabou
and Laroque 1990; Kumar and Seppi 1992). Although most of this litera-
ture does not directly address large players, these studies highlight poten-
tially important issues to complement our analysis above.
Conceptually, one can distinguish between three types of market manip-
ulation (see Allen and Gale 1992):
1. Action-based manipulation, based on actions that change the actual
or perceived value of the assets. This includes actions by insiders (such as
owners and or managers) as well as insider trading.
2. Information-based manipulation, based on the release of false infor-
mation or the spread of false rumors.
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manipulate a stock simply by buying and then selling, without taking any
publicly observable action to alter the value of the ﬁrm or releasing false in-
formation to change the price. This form of manipulation includes attempts
to corner the market for a good or an asset.
Because investors do not control national policy making, action-based
manipulation seems unlikely in international currency markets. Informa-
tion-based manipulation (rumor spreading) is a somewhat more interesting
possibility. Information-based manipulation models, however, require that
the manipulators have a real or perceived information advantage. The pres-
ence of inside information pertaining to the value of corporate securities
makes this assumption highly plausible in stock markets, but it is harder to
envision in foreign exchange markets. Still, even in these markets, there
could be particular conditions in which rumors and leaks, say, about the ac-
tions of reputable players, may have strong eﬀects that do not occur in nor-
mal times.
While trade-based manipulation is in principle the most relevant issue for
the purpose of this paper, it is not clear that such manipulation can be prof-
itable. Buying a stock tends to push its price up, while selling it tends to push
the price down. Consequently, if a large trader who attempts to manipulate
a market through trade ends up buying high and selling low, how can she
make a proﬁt?20 For a large trader with market power to proﬁt from trade
manipulation it is necessary that other (small) agents trade on the opposite
side of the market. However, if the manipulator makes net relative proﬁts,
these agents will lose. Who would take a position that implies net expected
losses or negative risk-adjusted returns?
Market manipulation appears to be proﬁtable only in particular circum-
stances, when there are agents with an informational disadvantage or
agents who have to sell or buy for some exogenous reason, perhaps receiv-
ing beneﬁts that compensate them for the losses in the trade.21 In the con-
tribution by Allen and Gorton (1992), for instance, traders with superior in-
formation can inﬂict losses on a specialist, thanks to exogenous trades by
agents who face binding liquidity constraints. The authors of this study cor-
rectly observe that the welfare implications of this example of trade manip-
ulation are ambiguous: why should policy makers care if some investors
make money at the expense of less informed specialists?
Market corners are another form of trade-based manipulation. For in-
stance, a trader may obtain control of a suﬃciently large share of the supply
of an asset that must be delivered in the futures or forward market.22 This
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20. Indeed, Jarrow (1992) shows formally that proﬁtable manipulation is impossible in an
eﬃcient market.
21. Theoretical examples are given by Kyle (1985), Jarrow (1992), Allen and Gorton (1992),
Allen and Gale (1992), and Kumar and Seppi (1992).
22. As in the cases of the Salomon Brothers’ Treasury market corner and the Hunt Broth-
ers’ corner of the silver market.type of manipulation may not be feasible in markets, such as the forex,
where the relevant assets are not in ﬁxed supply. Finally, we should note that
the issue of collusion, alleged to be a factor in recent market dynamics
episodes, has not been systematically studied by the literature on manipu-
lation.
Based on this overview of the literature, we can only attempt a prelimi-
nary assessment of the theoretical case for market manipulation by large
players in the forex market. The key observation is that successful manipu-
lation requires relatively strict informational and behavioral conditions.
For example, an individual fund should be large enough or leveraged
enough to be able to corner the market for a particular currency. Alterna-
tively, if no player was large enough to aﬀect markets by itself, manipulation
would require collusion among investors. In the absence of outright collu-
sion, some HFs would have to lead the trading strategies of a suﬃcient
number of traders—perhaps by verbal manipulation, “talking down” a
currency to encourage other market players to sell short. Although such
convergence of strategies is possible, there is currently no evidence that it
occurred in any of the turbulence episodes of the 1990s.
Manipulation is hard to prove even when it is clear that a large agent
talked down a currency or market. Suppose that a major market partici-
pant, believing that a currency is overvalued, places global macro bets
shorting that currency and publicly announces its views to this eﬀect. Be-
cause there is a broad range of uncertainty on whether a currency is over-
valued, how can one prove that the large agent’s public statement is a form
of market manipulation?
We conclude this section by noting that, although the social impact of
manipulation of individual equities may be ambiguous (because it leads to
a redistribution of wealth from less informed specialists to more informed
investors), successful manipulation of currency markets may have serious
welfare implications. Price movements away from fundamentals could be
associated with large and undesirable real eﬀects such as employment losses
and ﬁscal and monetary imbalances. Moreover, wealth would be redistrib-
uted from vulnerable emerging-market economies to powerful interna-
tional investors.
5.3 Large Players and Currency Markets: Empirical Studies
A key lesson of the 1997–99 episodes is that no single factor can entirely
explain the volatility in cross-border capital ﬂows, nor the large swings in as-
set prices that capital volatility sometimes causes. Corporate, ﬁnancial, and
policy weaknesses in emerging markets are often exacerbated by adverse
monetary and macroeconomic developments in advanced economies;
countries with diﬀerent domestic fundamentals have been equally vulner-
able to shifts in market sentiment among international investors. As a re-
sult, small countries that have been the recipients of international capital
The Role of Large Players in Currency Crises 221have also been increasingly worried by forces beyond their control in inter-
national capital markets.23 No wonder the role of HFs and other HLIs in
global ﬁnancial crises has been closely scrutinized and often criticized, es-
pecially during the second half of the last decade.
The evidence on the portfolio strategies of HFs and HLIs and their im-
pact in currency turbulence episodes is mixed. IMF (1998) ﬁnds some evi-
dence that HFs, acting as market leaders, helped precipitate the ERM cri-
sis in 1992, although they appear to have done so in response to economic
fundamentals. Regarding the same episode, Fung and Hsieh (1999b) show
that the 25 percent net asset value (NAV) gain of the Quantum Fund in Sep-
tember 1992 can be explained by its position against the British pound.24
However, this episode hardly proves that a single large player can cause the
collapse of an otherwise sound currency. It is generally agreed that the
pound was overvalued in 1992 and that a devaluation was necessary to re-
store the competitiveness of the U.K. economy.25 Although speciﬁc HFs
might have contributed to triggering the fall of the pound, this episode
hardly ﬁts the view that speculators successfully forced a devaluation not
justiﬁed by fundamentals.26
More recently, the authorities of a number of countries—such as
Malaysia, Hong Kong, and Australia—have claimed that the HFs’ role was
signiﬁcant in several recent crises: Such funds have been accused of leading
market dynamics, intentionally causing herding, and manipulating curren-
cies and other asset markets. However, some studies, especially IMF (1998)
and other research (see Brown, Goetzmann, and Park 2000; Fung, Hsieh,
and Tsatsaronis 2000), have expressed skepticism. A typical argument made
in these studies is that HFs were “at the rear of the herd of investors rather
than in the lead.” This view is partly at odds with the conclusions of the
more recent FSF oﬃcial study (FSF 2000) of the 1998 turmoil, which fo-
cused on a sample of small and medium-sized economies such as Hong
Kong, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, Singapore, and Malaysia.
Whereas the IMF study concluded that HFs had played only a minor role
in 1997, FSF found a more signiﬁcant impact of HFs and prop desks in the
episodes of turmoil in 1998.
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23. See Schadler et al. (1993) and Mussa et al. (1999) for emerging-market experience with
volatile capital ﬂows and some possible policy responses.
24. The authors infer the directional exposure of the Quantum Fund to several currencies
from data on its weekly or daily net asset values.
25. The debate on the 1992–93 crisis of the European Monetary System is assessed in Eichen-
green and Wyplosz (1993), Buiter, Corsetti, and Pesenti (1998a, b), and Eichengreen (2000).
26. In other episodes, notably the 1994 bond market turbulence, IMF (1998) shows that HFs
as a group bet on a decline in interest rates, realizing substantial losses when they instead rose.
Fung and Hsieh (1999a) and Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis (2000) show that the Quantum
Fund took positions in anticipation of a strengthening of the U.S. dollar against the yen in Feb-
ruary 1994, then suﬀered sharp losses as the yen appreciated. They also consider the perfor-
mance of several large macro HFs in the episodes of market turmoil in 1997–98. We return to
these case studies below.Some preliminary evidence about the performance of HFs for the period
1997–98 is presented in ﬁgures 5.1–5.4, where we plot the time series of the
NAVs of four large macro HFs,27in parallel with the Standard & Poor’s 500
index and the yen/dollar exchange rate.28Over this period, large macro HFs
were reported to be taking substantial long positions in the U.S. equity mar-
ket; they may also have been involved in the “yen carry trade” (borrowing
in yen to ﬁnance positions in other currencies or assets), as argued by Fung
and Hsieh (1999b).
For the Quantum fund, ﬁgure 5.1 suggests a strong correlation between
the NAV and the Standard & Poor’s 500 index in the ﬁrst eleven months of
1997. The comovement is loose afterwards. Parallel movements between the
yen/dollar exchange rate and the NAVs of the four HFs are apparent in the
fall of 1998, in coincidence with the rally of the yen. Over the same period,
the NAVs of these funds also seem to be aﬀected by the fall in the U.S. eq-
uity markets following the turmoil generated by the Russian crisis and the
near-collapse of Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM).
A striking feature of the performances of these four funds during the
1997–98 period is the size of ﬂuctuations. The Jaguar Fund’s NAV rose by
100 percent between the beginning of 1997 and August 1998 but lost 25 per-
cent of its value between August 1998 and the end of 1998. The Emerging
Growth Fund rose by 40 percent between January and May 1997, then fell
sharply, remaining on a downward trend until the end of 1998, when its
NAV was about 40 percent below its level at the beginning of 1997. The
Quasar Fund was volatile but on average rose by about 50 percent between
the beginning of 1997 and August 1998; after that, it plunged by 50 percent.
By the end of 1998, its NAV was at the same level as at the beginning of 1997.
The Quantum Fund rose by about 30 percent between the beginning of
1997 and November 1997, but then it was mostly on a downward trend, ap-
proaching, at the end of the sample, a level close to the one at the beginning
of 1998. Overall, the performance of three of these four funds in the 1997–
98 period was far from exceptional: Two funds had on average zero returns
over the period, while one lost almost 40 percent of its value. The fourth
fund gained over 40 percent over the same period.
In what follows we provide a reassessment of the foreign exchange strate-
gies of large players in light of our theoretical analysis. A few selected case
studies on turbulence episodes in emerging markets are preceded by an
analysis of the evidence on the aggregate foreign currency positions of large
market participants in advanced economies.
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27. These are the Quantum Fund, the Quasar International Fund, the Emerging Growth
Fund of the Quantum Group, and the Jaguar Fund. They were among the largest macro HFs
in the industry over the period considered. Data on their weekly (Wednesday) NAVs have been
collected from the Financial Times.
28. Similar charts appear in Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis (2000), who consider the perfor-







































































































































































































































































































































































































I5.3.1 The Treasury Foreign Currency Reports 
of Major Market Participants
We have argued before that a number of elements may contribute to a ﬁ-
nancial institution’s market power—asset size and leverage ability, visibil-
ity and reputation for superior information. In this section we investigate
the links among these elements, focusing on the currency market. Do large
players aﬀect the price of foreign currency? Can they have access to better
information than average market participants? Can they count on superior
forecasts of future exchange rate developments? Do they consistently take
long (short) positions in currencies whose value tends to appreciate (depre-
ciate) over time? To address these questions, at least on a preliminary basis,
we analyze the evidence on the foreign currency positions of the largest par-
ticipants in the U.S. forex market.
Major foreign exchange market participants are required by law to ﬁle
weekly and monthly reports on their holdings of foreign currency.29 An in-
stitution qualiﬁes as a major participant if, on the last business day of either
March, June, September, or December during the previous year, it had
more than the equivalent of $50 billion in foreign exchange contracts on its
books. Contracts include sales and purchases in the spot, forward, futures,
and options markets. Actual currency holdings (deposits) and any other
foreign currency–denominated securities are not included in the reports.
U.S.-based institutions ﬁle a consolidated report for their domestic and for-
eign subsidiaries, branches, and agencies. Subsidiaries of foreign entities
operating in the United States ﬁle only for themselves, not for their foreign
parents. Market participants with foreign currency holdings of less than
$50 billion but greater than $1 billion need only ﬁle a quarterly report.
In their weekly Treasury Foreign Currency (TFC) reports, major partic-
ipants indicate the amounts of foreign currency outstanding at the close of
business each Wednesday.30 The currencies included in the reports are the
Canadian dollar, German mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc, pound sterling,
and, since 1999, the euro. Also since 1999, reporting institutions approxi-
mate all other currency positions under the aggregate entry “U.S. dollar.”
Data are organized into four categories: foreign exchange spot, forward,
and futures purchased; foreign exchange spot, forward, and futures sold;
net options position delta equivalent value long or [short]; net reported
dealing position long or [short]. The ﬁrst two categories represent the out-
standing amounts of foreign exchange that the reporter has contracted to
receive or deliver. Contracts are reported on a gross basis, and when the
contracts provide for the exchange of one currency for another, both the
purchase and the sale are reported. Options (third category) are reported if
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29. 31 United States code 5315; 31 Code of Federal Regulation 128, Subpart C.
30. The reports are ﬁled no later than noon on the Friday following the Wednesday to which
the report applies.the aggregate notional principal amount of contracts purchased and sold
exceeds $500 million equivalent. Options are reported in terms of net “delta
equivalent,” an estimate of the relationship between an option’s value and
an equivalent currency hedge, that is, the amount of currency with the same
gain or loss characteristics as the option for small movements in the ex-
change rate.31 The fourth category is deﬁned as the actively managed net
dealing position monitored and used by each reporter for internal risk
management purposes. Estimates of net dealing position typically come
from internally generated reports.
Based on the TFC reports, since 1994 the Treasury Bulletin publishes in-
formation on the weekly, monthly, and quarterly foreign currency position
taken by all large players collectively. No information is released on single
participants’ positions, and data on their net dealing positions are unavail-
able even at the aggregate level. A previous study (Wei and Kim 1999) has
used this data set, covering the sample period 1994–96. Our paper covers the
entire sample available at the time of writing, January 1994 through June
2000. In 1996 thirty-six reporters qualiﬁed as major participants; of these,
twenty-nine were commercial banks and the remaining seven were other
forms of ﬁnancial institutions, including HFs. By 2000, the number of re-
porters was down to twenty-ﬁve, of which eighteen were banking institutions.
Table 5.1 provides summary statistics on major participants’ weekly po-
sitions, all expressed in millions of U.S. dollars.32Gross sales and purchases
of foreign currency are rather large (for instance, sales of Japanese yen av-
erage $1,459 billion, and purchases of marks average $1,252 billion) but net
positions are relatively small across currencies (net positions in yen are
about $20 billion in absolute value, and net positions in marks are on aver-
age $7.5 billion). The limited size of net relative to gross positions is partly
due to large market participants’ role as intermediaries: Reported foreign
currency transactions typically involve two oﬀsetting operations, such as a
purchase of foreign currency from the market on behalf of a client and the
sale of foreign currency to the client itself. However, limited net positions
also indicate unwillingness by major participants to maintain large specu-
lative positions at high (weekly) frequency. It is worth noting, however, that
large players’ net positions have increased over time, on average, across all
currencies in the sample except the Canadian dollar.
Figures 5.5–5.11 plot the weekly time series of aggregate net foreign cur-
rency positions, deﬁned as purchases minus sales of foreign exchange spot,
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31. Technically, the “delta equivalent” value represents the product of the ﬁrst partial deriv-
ative of an option valuation formula with respect to the price or rate of the underlying con-
tract, multiplied by the notional principal of the contract.
32. We consider data on positions in German marks only until the end of 1998. After 1999,
positions in marks are reported only if the institution separately manages the exchange rate
risk of the euro and the legacy currencies; otherwise, all legacy currency amounts are reported
as euro-denominated contracts.Table 5.1 Summary Statistics on the Treasury Foreign Currency Position Data
1994–2000
Standard
Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
U.K. pound
Purchased 337 622,847 165,994 339,847 917,309
Sold 337 611,583 159,274 339,060 906,447
Net options position 337 1,208 1,563 –5,473 6,243
Net foreign currency position 337 12,472 8,551 –2,576 40,193
Swiss franc
Purchased 337 334,790 62,349 216,129 519,961
Sold 337 339,857 65,951 215,423 531,052
Net options position 337 3,191 3,073 –4,473 10,394
Net foreign currency position 337 –1,876 3,823 –15,385 14,936
Japanese yen
Purchased 337 1,429,063 219,094 870,624 2,100,231
Sold 337 1,459,080 225,300 882,762 2,121,832
Net options position 337 10,142 3,625 2,824 23,085
Net foreign currency position 337 –19,876 11,933 –57,232 –704
Canadian dollar
Purchased 337 173,793 40,995 87,799 246,798
Sold 337 171,609 42,452 86,141 248,266
Net options position 337 –1,929 1,092 –4,410 995
Net foreign currency position 337 256 2,716 –11,423 7,179
1997–2000
U.K. pound
Purchased 182 755,470 96,081 568,827 917,309
Sold 182 737,607 95,455 550,143 906,447
Net options position 182 1,330 1,924 –5,473 6,243
Net foreign currency position 182 19,193 5,561 4,284 40,193
Swiss franc
Purchased 182 361,052 65,812 216,129 519,961
Sold 182 365,670 71,133 215,423 531,052
Net options position 182 2,054 3,246 –4,473 8,340
Net foreign currency position 182 –2,564 4,771 –15,385 14,936
Japanese yen
Purchased 182 1,573,070 186,778 1,175,914 2,100,231
Sold 182 1,611,159 184,751 1,202,603 2,121,832
Net options position 182 11,602 3,580 4,868 23,085
Net foreign currency position 182 –26,487 12,141 –57,232 –870
Canadian dollar
Purchased 182 205,602 18,538 159,173 246,798
Sold 182 204,945 20,030 154,471 248,266
Net options position 182 –1,936 1,394 –4,410 995
Net foreign currency position 182 –1,279 2,424 –11,423 4,719
1994–96
U.K. pound
Purchased 155 467,122 63,818 339,847 631,167
Sold 155 463,606 61,889 339,060 622,839
Net options position 155 1,065 971 –1,640 3,209
Net foreign currency position 155 4,580 2,672 –2,576 12,291Table 5.1 (continued)
1994–2000
Standard
Observations Mean Deviation Minimum Maximum
Swiss franc
Purchased 155 303,952 40,233 247,431 449,426
Sold 155 309,547 42,788 250,865 458,367
Net options position 155 4,527 2,213 803 10,394
Net foreign currency position 155 –1,068 1,980 –7,897 3,942
Japanese yen
Purchased 155 1,259,971 102,189 870,624 1,477,491
Sold 155 1,280,511 105,852 882,762 1,500,136
Net options position 155 8,427 2,852 2,824 13,996
Net foreign currency position 155 –12,113 5,013 –25,856 –704
Canadian dollar
Purchased 155 136,443 25,747 87,799 204,644
Sold 155 132,465 24,595 86,141 198,807
Net options position 155 –1,920 564 –3,215 –526
Net foreign currency position 155 2,058 1,770 –1,015 7,179
1994–98
German mark
Purchased 259 1,252,768 126,035 1,025,474 1,694,490
Sold 259 1,248,805 116,520 1,026,360 1,643,567
Net options position 259 3,519 5,386 –12,705 11,892
Net foreign currency position 259 7,481 12,606 –10,647 50,989
1994–96
German mark
Purchased 155 1,214,599 103,602 1,025,474 1,557,578
Sold 155 1,215,384 101,510 1,026,360 1,547,771
Net options position 155 6,529 2,644 –1,728 11,892
Net foreign currency position 155 5,744 9,237 –7,616 25,603
1997–98
German mark
Purchased 104 1,309,654 135,209 1,102,822 1,694,490
Sold 104 1,298,617 120,066 1,109,383 1,643,567
Net options position 104 –968 5,315 –12,705 7,834
Net foreign currency position 104 10,069 16,099 –10,647 50,989
1999–2000
Euro
Purchased 78 1,707,470 126,408 1,470,427 1,994,301
Sold 78 1,714,560 124,464 1,478,126 1,996,041
Net options position 78 –3,919 2,879 –9,953 2,451
Net foreign currency position 78 –11,009 10,916 –33,426 23,001
1999–2000
U.S. dollar
Purchased 78 5,198,645 188,140 4,549,910 5,665,935
Sold 78 5,228,695 177,475 4,598,793 5,657,587
Net options position 78 3,175 6,119 –9,481 17,290
Net foreign currency position 78 –26,875 17,362 –70,953 20,912
Notes: Data are reported in millions of U.S. dollars. Purchased (sold) refers to spot, forward, and futures con-
tracts purchased (sold) in that currency. Net options position is the net delta-equivalent value of the total op-





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































)forward, and futures, plus net options positions, all expressed in millions of
local currency (except for the contracts in yen, expressed in billions). The ﬁg-
ures also plot the relevant exchange rates, expressed as U.S. dollars per unit
of local currency. Visual inspection of these ﬁgures leaves the impression
that the two series tend to move in parallel: When a currency strengthens
against the dollar, large players systematically increase their purchases and
reduce their sales of that currency, unwinding their net positions in dollars.
For example, in ﬁgure 5.7, the weakening of the yen relative to the U.S.
dollar from the fall of 1997 through the summer of 1998 is strongly corre-
lated with increasing net short positions on the yen, rising from about ¥2
trillion (about $16 billion at the prevailing exchange rate) to over ¥8 trillion
(about $56 billion). The rally of the yen between August and October 1998
is also associated with a sharp and rapid unwinding of major participants’
short positions. In the case of the German mark (ﬁg. 5.9), the cycle of ap-
preciation against the U.S. dollar in the ﬁrst half of 1995 and depreciation
in the second half of that year appears to be correlated with an initial
buildup of long positions in marks and their subsequent reversal. Similar
episodes are noticeable for the pound, the euro, the Canadian dollar, and
the Swiss franc. There are, however, exceptions: Notably, the weakening of
the euro in 1999 (ﬁg. 5.10) seems to be associated with larger short positions
on this currency until the summer of 1999 but not afterwards.
Obviously, the direction of causality is not clear. On the one hand, large
players may aﬀect the price of the currency simply because of the size of
their net positions. On the other hand, large players observe current ex-
change rates and take into account the perceived strength or weakness of
the currency in determining their net position at the close of business, sub-
stantially extrapolating some persistence in the behavior of the exchange
rate over the very short term. Superior information by large players may
also explain why current positions appear at times to be associated with
contemporaneous and future exchange rate levels.
To provide formal statistical evidence on these correlations, we regress
the current (Wednesday) exchange rate on the foreign currency position de-
nominated in local currency.33 For sensitivity analysis we exclude from the
sample outliers34 and consider two subsamples, 1994–96 (as in the Wei and
Kim 1999 study) and 1997–2000. The ﬁrst column of table 5.2 reports the
results. In general, the regressions provide evidence in support of a strong
positive link between exchange rates and simultaneous net positions. The
results are particularly striking in the case of the pound, the Canadian dol-
lar, the yen, the Swiss franc, and the euro. The link is weaker in the case of
the German mark, as the coeﬃcient is statistically signiﬁcant only at the 10
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33. For sensitivity analysis, we also regress the exchange rate on currency positions con-
verted into U.S. dollars. The results are substantially similar.
34. The outliers are identiﬁed visually as 5/19/1999 (Canadian dollar), 9/15/1999 (Swiss
franc), and 1/6/1999 (euro). Outliers play little role in our results.Table 5.2 Regressions of Level Exchange Rate on Net Foreign Currency Position
Net FCP
Current One-Week Lag Net FCP lag
U.K. pound
1994–2000 69.0** 33.5** 37.8**
(4.46) (11.50) (11.50)
1994–96 109.0** 71.5** 47.6*
(18.9) (28.0) (28.0)
1997–2000 22.4** 9.3 18.3
(9.06) (13.00) (13.10)
Canadian dollar
1994–2000 40.1** 23.7** 21.7**
(3.60) (5.47) (5.49)
1994–96 9.39** 6.90 4.40
(3.53) (6.95) (6.89)
1997–2000 9.83* 6.20 6.70
(5.44) (6.49) (6.44)
Excluding outliers
1994–2000 41.6** 25.4** 20.5**
(3.70) (5.76) (5.62)
1994–96 9.39** 6.90 4.40
(3.53) (6.95) (6.89)
1997–2000 10.4* 6.6 6.5
(5.74) (6.95) (6.56)
Swiss franc
1994–2000 28.8** 18.9 12.6
(7.58) (13.30) (13.30)
1994–96 25.2 35.9 –5.4
(18.3) (29.9) (30.2)
1997–2000 1.8 4.2 –3.0
(3.93) (6.76) (6.76)
Japanese yen
1994–2000 4.17** 1.90** 2.42**
(0.3) (0.9) (0.9)
1994–96 3.99** 2.30 2.50
(1.2) (2.0) (2.0)
1997–2000 1.98** 0.70 1.34*
(0.294) (0.785) (0.785)
German mark
1994–98 3.19* –6.7 10.2
(1.68) (6.65) (6.69)
1994–96 19.9** 2.6 17.9**
(1.84) (5.38) (5.36)
1997–98 3.83** –0.1 4.0
(0.703) (3.13) (3.15)percent level; it is signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level if we regress the exchange
rate on net positions expressed in U.S. dollars. Breaking the sample into two
periods does not signiﬁcantly alter the results; in general, the t-statistics fall
in the most recent subsample, with the notable exception of the yen.
The relation between the exchange rate and net position is also signiﬁcant
when we introduce lagged values of the latter variable. In the second column
of table 5.2 we report results based on regressing the Wednesday exchange
rate on current and one-week lagged net positions. The coeﬃcients of both
regressors are signiﬁcantly positive in the cases of the pound, the Canadian
dollar, and the yen. In other words, past net positions help to predict cur-
rent exchange rates:35 Large players tend to take long positions in curren-
cies that are strong and remain so for a while—a result reﬂecting some de-
gree of persistence in exchange rates.36
Are net positions associated with changes (rather than levels) of exchange
rates over time? If a signiﬁcant relation were found between net positions
and movements of the exchange rate, two interpretations would be possible.
On the one hand, if large players had superior information, they should be
able to anticipate currency movements, selling short before depreciation.
On the other hand, large players could aﬀect the movement of the exchange
rate simply because of the size of their trading.
Table 5.3 reports the results of regressing the ex post exchange rate de-
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Table 5.2 (continued)
Net FCP
Current One-Week Lag Net FCP lag
Euro
1999–2000 30.7** 26.5** 9.4
(6.2) (8.6) (8.5)
Excluding outliers
1999–2000 33.4** 26.5** 9.4
(5.9) (8.6) (8.5)
Notes: The ﬁrst column reports results of the regression of the level exchange rate (US$ per
unit of foreign currency) on the current net foreign currency position (in millions of local cur-
rency, except for billions of Japanese yen). The second column reports results including the
one-week lag of the net foreign currency position (Net FCP_lag). Coefﬁcient estimates and
standard errors (reported in parentheses) are multiplied by 107. Constants are not reported.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.
35. Separate regressions, not reported here, show that the correlation between current posi-
tions and future levels of the exchange rate holds signiﬁcantly for horizons up to two months
for most currencies.
36. Also, this result is not inconsistent with an interpretation according to which large play-
ers’ positions today inﬂuence other market participants’ behavior, leading them to take simi-
lar net positions over time (a form of momentum trading).Table 5.3 Regression of Log Difference Exchange Rate on Net Foreign Currency Position
Horizon (Days)
Currency 1 2 3 5 10 20 60
U.K. pound
1994–2000 0.40 –0.10 –0.50 –0.60 –1.10 –2.10 –9.49**
(0.498) (0.748) (0.897) (1.030) (1.47) (1.99) (2.89)
1994–96 –2.0 –0.2 –2.0 –2.3 –2.7 4.8 –30.6**
(2.08) (3.20) (3.94) (4.69) (6.49) (8.53) (12.70)
1997–2000 2.00* 2.77* 3.00 3.00 5.00 8.01* 12.80**
(1.11) (1.64) (1.89) (2.18) (3.14) (4.31) (6.08)
Canadian dollar
1994–2000 –0.80 –1.20* –0.90 –0.20 –0.20 1.00 8.43**
(0.471) (0.656) (0.849) (0.958) (1.320) (1.780) (2.910)
1994–96 –0.8 –0.3 0.4 1.3 1.6 5.8 –0.3
(0.857) (1.200) (1.790) (2.030) (2.790) (3.960) (6.590)
1997–2000 –0.3 –1.4 –1.4 –1.5 –2.3 –2.6 10.4**
(0.817) (1.140) (1.360) (1.540) (2.110) (2.750) (4.460)
Excluding outliers
1994–2000 –0.827* –1.150* –0.700 –0.400 –0.500 1.200 8.440**
(0.486) (0.677) (0.878) (0.988) (1.360) (1.840) (3.000)
1994–96 –0.8 –0.3 0.4 1.3 1.6 5.8 –0.3
(0.857) (1.200) (1.790) (2.030) (2.790) (3.960) (6.590)
1997–2000 –0.3 –1.3 –1.0 –2.0 –3.1 –2.5 10.6**
(0.862) (1.210) (1.440) (1.620) (2.220) (2.910) (4.710)
Swiss franc
1994–2000 –1.38** –2.17** –1.70 –1.30 –2.70 –5.110* –10.70**
(0.646) (0.993) (1.170) (1.420) (2.020) (2.870) (5.080)
1994–96 0.9 2.0 1.8 0.5 0.6 7.6 81.5**
(2.3) (3.28) (4.05) (4.84) (7.07) (10.1) (18.6)
1997–2000 –1.41** –2.86** –2.69** –2.00 –3.99* –8.20* –24.00**
(0.647) (1.050) (1.170) (1.490) (2.100) (2.870) (4.340)
Japanese yen
1994–2000 –2.30 1.00 9.73** 2.50 1.80 –2.50 –54.10**
(2.6) (4.1) (5.0) (5.8) (8.4) (12.5) (23.1)
1994–96 –2.8 7.7 24.8 44.6** 81.4** 169.0** 487.0**
(10.0) (15.8) (18.6) 21.8 (31.5) (49.1) (96.0)
1997–2000 –1.8 1.2 10.5 1.9 –1.2 –10.4 –85.2**
(3.77) (5.83) (7.16) (8.34) (12.20) (17.70) (29.60)
German mark
1994–98 0.388** 0.400 0.400 0.500 0.800 0.900 –2.200
(0.174) (0.274) (0.331) (0.389) (0.545) (0.799) (1.430)
1994–96 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.5 1.1 1.6 0.9
(0.371) (0.551) (0.683) (0.785) (1.110) (1.600) (2.940)
1997–98 0.30 0.30 0.40 0.60 0.90 1.00 –2.77*
(0.182) (0.314) (0.371) (0.453) (0.625) (0.934) (1.590)
Euro
1999–2000 –0.80 –0.70 –1.00 –2.00 –3.20 –6.49** –5.60
(0.7) (1.0) (1.1) (1.5) (2.2) (2.9) (4.1)
Excluding outliers
1999–2000 –0.80 –0.90 –1.20 –2.00 –3.40 –6.94** –6.40
(0.7) (1.0) (1.1) (1.6) (2.2) (2.9) (4.1)
Notes:The table reports the coefﬁcient of the regression of the log-difference exchange rate (US$ per unit of for-
eign currency) on the net foreign currency position. Coefﬁcient estimates and standard errors (reported in paren-
theses) are multiplied by 107. Constants are not reported.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.preciation rate on lagged net positions. As above, for sensitivity analysis we
report estimates for the two subsamples and excluding outliers. We consider
diﬀerent time horizons for the rate of depreciation: one day (Thursday on
Wednesday), two days, three days (Monday on Wednesday), ﬁve days
(Wednesday on Wednesday), two weeks, four weeks, and twelve weeks. The
results are, to say the least, mixed.
There is some indication that large players take positions against curren-
cies that tend to depreciate. At very short horizons (from one to three days)
there is at least one statistically signiﬁcant, positive coeﬃcient for the mark
and the yen (three days). In the case of the pound, the coeﬃcient is signif-
icant only at the 10 percent level and only in the 1997–2000 subsample.
There is a statistically signiﬁcant relation, but with the wrong sign, in the
case of the Swiss franc. In many cases the coeﬃcients are not signiﬁcant,
and some have the wrong sign. The picture does not change if we lengthen
the horizon of the depreciation.37 When we compare our results with previ-
ous studies, the evidence that exchange rate changes are correlated with the
net positions of large players is only marginally stronger.38
To sum up, although high-frequency noise in exchange rate changes may
explain the weak correlation between net positions and short-term changes
in exchange rates, the level regressions point to persistent low-frequency
movements (“long cycles” of exchange rates) associated with aggregate net
positions. Overall, the evidence suggests that the net positions of large play-
ers are signiﬁcantly correlated with exchange rates; this can be attributed to
either size or informational advantages.
5.3.2 The Pressures on the Thai Baht in the Spring and Summer of 1997
We now turn to case studies of currency crises in which HFs and other
large traders were alleged to have played a key role. The ﬁrst episode we con-
sider is the attack on the Thai baht, whose fall in the summer of 1997 started
the Asian currency and ﬁnancial crisis.39
An assessment of Thai economic fundamentals suggests that the cur-
rency was overvalued. The country had run large current account deﬁcits
for almost a decade, and the currency had appreciated in real terms. Exter-
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37. When twelve weeks are considered, there is a strongly signiﬁcant relation for the pound,
the Canadian dollar, the Swiss franc, the euro, and the yen. The problem is that, with the only
exception being the Canadian dollar, the sign is always negative—that is, large players sys-
tematically take long positions in currencies that, on average, tend to depreciate over the next
quarter. One could interpret this result as implying some mean reversion in exchange rate re-
turns.
38. Wei and Kim (1997) do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant positive association between large par-
ticipants’ position in a foreign currency and the latter’s subsequent appreciation. A nonpara-
metric approach ﬁnds some weak support for a positive association, but not on a systematic
basis. Recall that this study is limited to the 1994–96 period, whereas we extend the sample up
to the year 2000.
39. For a reconstruction of the Asian crisis and the debate surrounding these events see
Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini (1999).nal imbalances had been ﬁnanced through short-term unhedged liabilities,
making the country vulnerable to a liquidity run. Also, there were severe
weaknesses in the ﬁnancial system that eventually led to a banking crisis.
On the other hand, high growth, high investment and savings rates, and a
prudent ﬁscal policy suggest that the country was not seriously misman-
aged.
The analytical models discussed in the ﬁrst part of this paper suggest that
a country with weak fundamentals may be vulnerable to the market dy-
namics either generated or fed by short positions taken by large players.
Smaller players react to the actions taken by the large player by becoming
more aggressive in their speculative behavior. Thus, one question is whether
large HFs were “leaders of the pack” in this particular currency crisis
episode. On this issue, the IMF (1998) study is skeptical, arguing that the
HFs were at the rear rather than at the head of the pack (see also Eichen-
green and Mathieson 1999).
This conclusion appears to be somewhat at odds with the very informa-
tion available in the IMF study, let alone other sources of evidence. For in-
stance, IMF (1998) shows that some large HFs had already taken signiﬁ-
cant short positions against the Thai baht in the spring of 1997, presumably
based on a negative economic assessment of Thai fundamentals (stressing
the size and persistence of the current account deﬁcit and the overvaluation
of the exchange rate). The estimated net short position of the HFs in Thai-
land was about $7 billion.40 Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis (2000) estimate
that twelve HFs had about $5 billion in short positions against the Thai
baht at the end of June 1997.41
The evidence on HFs’ taking short positions before the eruption of the
crisis is indirectly conﬁrmed by the econometric results presented in table
5.4, part A. Using weekly data, we regress the NAV of four large macro
HFs42 against the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, the yen/dollar exchange
rate, and the value of the Thai baht in the period from February through
July 1997—when the baht was under pressure.43 As argued before, the ﬁrst
two regressors control for the hypothesis that these funds had signiﬁcant in-
244 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel Roubini
40. This is an estimate of direct forward transactions with the Bank of Thailand. Short po-
sitions may have been larger as “hedge funds may also have sold baht forward through oﬀshore
intermediaries, onshore foreign banks, and onshore domestic banks, which then oﬀ-loaded
their positions (commitments to purchase) to the central bank. Hence, there is no way of ac-
curately estimating their total transactions” (Eichengreen and Mathieson 1999).
41. Estimated short positions are lower after July 1997 as such funds took proﬁts on their
shorts and partially closed these positions. Thus, while HFs may have played a role in trigger-
ing the initial collapse of the baht, they played a lesser role in the continued fall of the currency
throughout the summer and fall of 1997. For example, according to Fung and Hsieh (1999a)
there is no evidence that the Quantum Fund had shorted the baht during September 1997,
when this currency fell sharply.
42. These are the same considered in ﬁgures 5.1–5.4 and section 5.3.1.
43. For the Jaguar Fund the sample period is the full 1997–98 period, as we found signiﬁcant
eﬀects of all regressors throughout the sample.Table 5.4 Hedge Fund Net Asset Value Regressions
S&P Yen Baht
A. February 1997–July 1997
Quantum 0.65** 0.08 0.25**
(0.1) (0.16) (0.06)
Quasar 0.10 0.98** 0.29**
(0.12) (0.18) (0.07)
Emerging growth N/A 2.62** 0.31**
(0.22) (0.12)
Jaguar (1997–98) 0.72** 1.61** 0.29**
(0.06) (0.10) (0.04)
B. May 1998–September 1998
S&P Yen HIBOR
Quantum 0.51 0.32 0.00
(0.38) (0.74) (0.12)
Quasar 1.08** 2.30** 0.14*
(0.26) (0.50) (0.08)
Emerging growth N/A 2.21** –0.32**
(0.51) (0.09)
Jaguar (1997–98) 0.99** 1.64** 0.12**
(0.05) (0.10) (0.02)
C. May 1998–September 1998
S&P Yen Hang Seng
Quantum 0.22 0.79 0.16
(0.35) (0.57) (0.15)
Quasar 0.28 3.75** 0.23**
(0.23) (0.37) (0.10)
Emerging growth N/A 1.87** 0.47**
(0.42) (0.11)
Jaguar (1997–98) 0.83** 1.20** –0.28**
(0.05) (0.12) (0.03)
D. February 1997–July 1997
S&P Yen Ringgit
Quantum 0.90** 0.40** 0.27
(0.14) (0.19) (0.38)
Quasar 0.22 1.20** 0.83**
(0.15) (0.20) (0.40)
Emerging growth N/A 2.60** 0.42
(0.26) (0.60)
Jaguar (1997–98) 0.49** 1.37** 0.50**
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05)
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Constants are not reported.
**Signiﬁcant at the 5 percent level.
*Signiﬁcant at the 10 percent level.vestments in the U.S. equity markets and may have shorted the Japanese yen
to fund positions in other markets (Fung and Hsieh 1999b). The results
show signiﬁcant eﬀects of the Thai baht on the NAV of the four funds: The
NAVs increase when the baht weakens. The Standard & Poor’s index and
the yen/dollar rate also enter signiﬁcantly in these regressions with the ex-
pected sign.44
The overall short positions by large traders ($7 billion in the estimate by
IMF 1998) represent only a quarter of the Bank of Thailand’s $28 billion
forward book at the end of July 1997. This suggests that many other in-
vestors besides HFs had built short positions in baht before the currency’s
fall in July. According to the IMF study, although “HFs apparently sold
some long-dated forward contracts on the baht in February 1997, the bulk
of their forward sales to the Bank of Thailand seems to have occurred in
May” when signiﬁcant speculative pressure on the currency started to build
up and Thailand introduced some capital controls to limit the speculation
against its currency.45
On balance, the conclusion in the IMF study that HFs were at the rear of
the pack is not strongly supported by the data. Although lack of informa-
tion prevents a full assessment of the sequence of events and movements by
players of diﬀerent sizes, a plausible interpretation is that large macro HFs
detected rather early the fundamental weaknesses of the baht and the like-
lihood of a devaluation. Since the buildup of short positions started in Feb-
ruary and continued through May, one could argue that HFs actually
moved ﬁrst and were followed by a wide range of domestic and interna-
tional investors.
On the basis of our analysis in the second part of section 5.2.4, the argu-
ment that the HFs were “small” in the baht market (short positions for $7
billion against $25 billion at the central bank) needs to be qualiﬁed. If the
HFs’ short positions had been built by the time of the May attack (after the
capital controls of 15 May and the spikes in oﬀshore rates, it became much
more expensive to short the currency), they would have accounted for a
large fraction of the forward book of the central bank by the end of May.
Although the eventual fall of the baht was certainly triggered by funda-
mental weaknesses in the economy, the evidence is not inconsistent with the
view that HFs moved ﬁrst and their presence made other investors more ag-
gressive in their trading strategies.
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44. The Standard & Poor’s index is not included in the Emerging Growth Fund because this
fund invests mostly in emerging markets. Indeed, the Standard & Poor’s regressor is not sig-
niﬁcant when included in the regressions.
45. In one week in May, the central bank intervened by selling about $15 billion. Since this
intervention was in the forward market, this information did not become public until August
1997. Smaller speculative attacks had occurred in January, February, and March (see Ito
1999).5.3.3 The “Double Play” Hypothesis in Hong Kong
In 1998, the currency and other asset markets in Hong Kong felt signiﬁ-
cant speculative pressures as the Asian crisis worsened. Local authorities
argued that large macro HFs were attempting to inﬂuence Hong Kong’s
forex and equity markets (Hong Kong Monetary Authority [HKMA] 1999;
HKMA and Reserve Bank of Australia 1999; Tsang 1998). Allegedly, large
traders were implementing a “double play”: shorting the equity market,
then shorting the currency, so as to lead monetary authorities either to
abandon the ﬁxed exchange rate or to increase interest rates sharply, or
both, and proﬁt from falling stock prices.
In the view of the Hong Kong authorities, the double play proceeded as
follows. First, HFs shorted the Hong Kong (spot) stock market as well as
the Hang Seng Index futures. HFs allegedly prefunded their Hong Kong
dollar needs via swaps with multilateral ﬁnancial institutions that had heav-
ily borrowed in 1997 and 1998. Next, by using forward purchases of U.S.
dollars and spot sales of Hong Kong dollars, they tried to induce a devalu-
ation. Apparently, the size of the short positions of these HFs in the forex
and stock markets were very large.
Suppose that, to defend the currency board arrangement, the Hong
Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) had intervened in the foreign ex-
change market only, drying up market liquidity and causing a correspond-
ingly large increase in interest rates. The monetary tightening would have
caused a sharp drop in equity prices, to the beneﬁt of the HFs and other in-
vestors who had taken short positions in the stock market.
Suppose instead that, to avoid this stock market collapse, the HKMA
had kept interest rates low, while allowing the exchange rate to devalue.
Again, the HFs would have reaped large gains, this time through their po-
sitions in the currency markets. In either scenario, speculators would have
gained from their positions in the stock market or in the forex market, or
both.46
The HKMA, however, chose a diﬀerent and unconventional option, con-
sisting of monetary tightening to prevent devaluation and, in August 1998,
sizable interventions in the stock markets to support stock prices.47 In the
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46. Chakravorti and Lall (2000) develop an analytical model of simultaneous speculative at-
tack on currency and equity markets that is designed to explain the double play hypothesis for
Hong Kong. They identify the conditions under which a simultaneous shorting of equity and
currency/money markets is a potentially proﬁtable strategy. The model suggests that a simul-
taneous shorting of the two markets could result from poor economic fundamentals and an in-
crease in the probability that a devaluation may occur. They also explicitly model the eﬀects of
central bank intervention in the stock market (as occurred in Hong Kong).
47. In the two weeks between August 14 and 28, 1998, the HKMA purchased approximately
US$15 billion of stocks and futures. This represented about 7 percent of the Hong Kong mar-
ket capitalization and about 30 percent of the free ﬂoat in the market.view of the Hong Kong authorities, this radical action was necessary to in-
ﬂict losses on speculators and give them suﬃcient cause to be wary of future
attempts to corner the market. In the words of Financial Secretary Donald
Tsang, the speculative attack “was a contrived game with clearly destructive
goals in mind [to] drive up interest rates, drive down share prices, make the
local population panic and exert enough pressure on the linked exchange
rate until it breaks” (Tsang 1998).
The FSF (2000) study supports the double play hypothesis. Large macro
HFs appear to have detected fundamental weaknesses early and started to
build large short positions against the currency. According to available es-
timates, HLIs’ short positions in the HK$ market were close to U.S.$ 10 bil-
lion (6 percent of GDP), but some observers believe that the correct ﬁgure
was much higher. Several large macro HFs that had shorted the currency
also took very large short positions in the equity markets, and these posi-
tions were correlated over time.48When the news spread that large HFs were
building short positions, other investors followed.
Indirect evidence on the positions of HFs in the Hong Kong currency
and equity markets can be provided by regressing the NAV of the four large
macro HFs in our sample against the Standard & Poor’s 500 index, the
yen/dollar rate, the Hang Seng equity index, and a short-term interest rate
measure in Hong Kong (the three-month Hong Kong Interbank Oﬀered
Rate [HIBOR]) for the period May to September 1998. A negative relation
between NAV and the equity index is consistent with short positions of the
fund in the Hong Kong equity market. Also, because Hong Kong kept the
exchange rate ﬁxed throughout the sample period, proﬁtable short posi-
tions in the currency markets would show up as a positive coeﬃcient on the
short-term interest rate—interest rate hikes lead to an increase in the for-
ward exchange rate, raising the NAV of a portfolio including short positions
in the currency. Results are presented in parts B and C of table 5.4, where
we ﬁnd strong and signiﬁcant eﬀects of the expected sign (negative on the
Hang Seng index and positive on the HIBOR) for one of the funds, and a
signiﬁcant eﬀect of the HIBOR for another fund.49
According to the local authorities (Tsang 1998), unsubstantiated rumors
and false information about the health of the ﬁnancial sector and the pos-
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48. “Among those taking short positions in the equity market were four large HFs, whose
futures and options positions were equivalent to around 40 percent of all outstanding equity
futures contracts as of early August prior to the HKMA intervention. Position data suggest a
correlation, albeit far from perfect, in the timing of the establishment of the short positions.
Two HFs substantially increased their positions during the period of the HKMA intervention.
At the end of August, four hedge funds accounted for 50,500 contracts or 49 percent of the to-
tal open interest/net delta position; one fund accounted for one-third. The group’s meetings
suggested that some large HLIs had large short positions in both the equity and currency mar-
kets” (FSF 2000, 131).
49. The coeﬃcients of the Hang Seng index on two other funds are signiﬁcant but with the
wrong sign. It is possible that losses inﬂicted on short equity positions by the Hong Kong in-
tervention may account for this result.sibility of a devaluation were being spread in the local press and in ﬁnancial
markets, apparently to push down the stock market, spike interest rates,
and put pressure on the currency. The FSF (2000) study mentions circum-
stantial evidence of aggressive trading behavior in the forex market: “Ag-
gressive trading practices by HLIs reportedly included concentrated selling
intended to move market prices, large sales in illiquid oﬀshore trading
hours, and ‘spooﬁng’ of the electronic brokering services to give the im-
pression that the exchange rate had moved beyond the HKMA’s interven-
tion level. There were frequent market rumors, often in oﬀshore Friday
trading, that a devaluation of the Hong Kong dollar or Chinese renminbi
would occur over the weekend” (FSF 2000, 130–31).
However, the empirical ﬁndings do not provide, per se, evidence of mar-
ket manipulation. Macroeconomic conditions in Hong Kong and East Asia
in the summer of 1998 (a sharp recession in Hong Kong and a worsening ﬁ-
nancial and economic crisis in the entire East Asian region, with a falling
yen and a threat of currency devaluation in China) were causing concern
among investors about the Hong Kong stock market while raising doubts
about the survival of the Hong Kong currency peg, in spite of the commit-
ment by the authorities to maintain the currency board. Shorting both the
Hong Kong stock market and its currency at that time could have been in-
terpreted as a rational strategy for all investors, domestic and foreign,
highly leveraged and not, behaving according to normal market rules and
conventions. In other words, the hypothesis of rational investors’ taking
short positions in two markets (based on an assessment of economic fun-
damentals) and the hypothesis of a double play (suggesting market manip-
ulation) are observationally equivalent.
5.3.4 The Malaysian Ringgit
The role played by macro HFs in the fall of the Malaysian ringgit remains
controversial. Local authorities have forcefully argued that their presence
made a signiﬁcant diﬀerence. However, several studies (IMF 1998 and
Brown, Goetzmann, and Park 2000) suggest that their role was minor.
As in the case of many other currencies in the region, the pressure on the
ringgit was undoubtedly driven by fundamental weaknesses in the econ-
omy, namely a large current account deﬁcit and a structurally weak ﬁnan-
cial system, as well as ﬁnancial and trade contagion from the fall of other
Association of Southeast Asian Nations currencies. Nonetheless, it is unre-
solved whether HFs were leaders of the pack in the circumstances that trig-
gered the fall of the ringgit and the continued pressures on the currency
throughout 1997 and 1998.
How large were HFs’ short positions against the ringgit? The aforemen-
tioned IMF study suggests that their positions were relatively small at the
time of the devaluation of the baht, July 1997, when pressures on the
Malaysian currency started to rise. Fung, Hsieh, and Tsatsaronis (2000)
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the ringgit market by twelve HFs amounted to less than $1 billion in June
and July 1997.
A study by Brown, Goetzmann, and Park (2000) reaches analogous con-
clusions. Using returns data, these authors derive estimates of the positions
in the Malaysian ringgit over time by the largest ten currency funds. They
ﬁnd that positions in the ringgit did ﬂuctuate dramatically in the second
half of the 1990s but were not correlated with movements in the exchange
rate. More generally, they identify periods when the HFs had very large ex-
posures to Asian currencies, both positive and negative, but ﬁnd no relation
between these positions and current, past, or future movements in exchange
rates.
Some aspects of this study, however, are problematic. Speciﬁcally, these
authors did not have access to data on net positions but inferred them from
observed returns, so serious measurement errors are possible. For example,
some of their estimates imply that the gross foreign currency positions on
the ringgit were at times close to 200 percent of Malaysian GDP. For in-
stance, in February 1996 the estimated short position by HFs was greater
than $200 billion. At the end of June 1997, when the pressure on the cur-
rency started to mount, the estimated HFs short positions reached a new
peak of $100 billion. Now, either these estimates are subject to signiﬁcant
measurement error or, if correct, their size makes it diﬃcult to argue that
HFs’ portfolios had no impact on the value of the Malaysian currency. Sta-
tistical tests suggest that, for two of the four funds in our sample, NAVs
were signiﬁcantly correlated with movements of the ringgit after controlling
for the Standard & Poor’s and the yen/dollar rate.50
Ultimately, even when one accounts for the apparent gross mismeasure-
ment, the study leaves open the possibility that large traders built sizable
positions at the start of the speculative pressure against the ringgit (late
June and early July 1997). This is consistent with the view that HFs took
large positions before other domestic and foreign investors began to short
the currency. In this regard, and based mostly on circumstantial evidence,
the FSF (2000) study came to the conclusion that “the ringgit came under
heavy selling pressure around May 1997 during the pressures on the Thai
baht. Leveraged institutions reportedly had substantial short positions at
this time. Pressures continued after the authorities ﬂoated the ringgit in
July” (FSF 2000, 133).
5.3.5 The Pressures on the Australian Dollar in the Summer of 1998
The view that HFs played a signiﬁcant role in the pressures on the Aus-
tralian dollar in the summer of 1998 has been presented in Reserve Bank of
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50. See part D of table 5.4. In the regressions, the sample period for the Jaguar Fund is 1997–
98, but it is February–July 1997 for the other three funds.Australia (1999). The Australian view is nuanced. The Australian authori-
ties accept that a moderate depreciation of the Australian dollar might have
been justiﬁed by fundamentals in June and August of 1998. In June, the
Australian currency was negatively aﬀected by a weakening Japanese yen
and by concerns about the spread and deepening of the Asian crisis. In Au-
gust, the pressure on the Australian currency was triggered by the Russian
collapse and expectations of falling commodity prices in a global slow-
down.
Although acknowledging the rationale for a depreciation in light of these
fundamental weaknesses, the Australian view was that large macro HFs
manipulated foreign currency markets to force a depreciation well in excess
of what was justiﬁed by fundamentals. The Australian authorities argued
that, even though the Australian dollar exchange rate market was very liq-
uid and had one of the highest turnover rates among Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development countries, HFs were nonetheless try-
ing to manipulate it in diﬀerent ways. First, HFs were supposedly able to
borrow Australian dollar funds from Australian banks in large amounts in
order to build speculative positions in the foreign exchange market. Second,
a few large HFs were allegedly signalling their short positions in the Aus-
tralian dollar market, eﬀectively becoming leaders for a wide set of funds
and ﬁnancial institutions. As a result, by taking very large short positions
against the Australian dollar while inducing other investors to follow a sim-
ilar strategy, the HFs were eﬀectively able to corner the market.
Reportedly, the overall short positions against the Australian dollar were
sizable in the summer of 1998. Only a very aggressive intervention by the
Reserve Bank of Australia in June and August (and eventually the unravel-
ing of the yen carry trade) could stop what looked like a large speculative at-
tempt to cause an unwarranted collapse of the currency.
An interesting feature of the Australian case is that the speculative attack
hit a ﬂexible, rather than a ﬁxed, exchange rate regime. FSF (2000) provides
a systematic study of the Australian episode, suggesting that HLIs built up
speculative short positions against the Australian dollar from late 1997 on-
ward. The speculative activity intensiﬁed in April and May 1998: By the end
of May, the currency had fallen 24 percent below its peak in late 1996. In
June 1998, the pressures on the currency increased, with short positions by
HFs and other HLIs estimated at roughly $10 billion, about 2 percent of
Australian GDP.
The study found evidence of aggressive trading, shrinkage of liquidity,
the spread of rumors, the moving of contrarians to the sidelines, and herd-
ing along the HLI positions. In particular, “having already accumulated
large short positions, a few HLIs—primarily large macro HFs—according
to some market participants took actions in late May and early June to at-
tempt to push the exchange rate lower. These actions reportedly included
spreading rumors about an upcoming attack in the currency to deter buy-
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large amounts of sales into periods of thin trading. These actions were re-
ported by market participants to be designed in part to cause those who
might have taken contrarian positions to withdraw from the market. One
consequence was that exporters, who had been consistent buyers of Aus-
tralian dollars at higher levels, not only stood aside and stopped buying at
this time but some even began selling as the currency looked to fall to record
lows” (FSF 2000, 128).
5.3.6 Financial and Currency Turmoil in South Africa in 1998
The case study of South Africa in 1998 is interesting for a number of rea-
sons. First, the country had a semiﬂexible exchange rate regime, yet the au-
thorities heavily intervened in the forward market to defend the currency
when strong speculative pressures emerged in the spring of 1998. Second, as
in Hong Kong, investors may have attempted a double play. In this case,
however, the double play was staged in the bond and forex markets rather
than in the equity and forex markets. Third, according to FSF (2000), the
main role in the ﬁnancial market was played by proprietary desks of large
international ﬁnancial ﬁrms, rather than large macro HFs.
As in previous episodes, macro policy was generally sound, but the econ-
omy was hit by a number of shocks at the time of the turmoil. In the spring
of 1998, the economy was suﬀering from political uncertainty, a fall in the
price of gold and other export commodities, and a conﬁdence deteriora-
tion, all of which led to a downgrade of GDP growth forecasts. Until April
1998, many nonresident investors—including HLIs—had built long posi-
tions in South African assets (especially government bonds). A major re-
versal of capital ﬂows occurred in May and June 1998, with outﬂows by
nonresidents estimated at about 24 billion rand.
These speculative pressures led between April and August to a 25 percent
fall of the rand, a 40 percent plunge of the equity market, and sharp in-
creases in the yields on medium-term bonds from 12.9 percent to 21.6 per-
cent. The central bank initially responded to the pressure on the currency
by aggressively intervening in the forward market (selling about $8 billion
of reserves forward in May and June). Total short foreign exchange posi-
tions were estimated to be about US$8–9 billion (approximately 7 percent
of GDP), thus equivalent to total forward interventions. At the same time,
investors could easily build short ﬁxed-income positions in the government
bond market by borrowing in the large and liquid repo market. As reported
in FSF (2000), some suggested that a double play took the form of aggres-
sive sales of the currency to spike short-term interest rates and proﬁt from
short positions in the bond market.
The fall in the rand accelerated in June after the reserve bank stopped in-
tervening. The publication of the forward book showed that the reserve
bank was then vulnerable to large losses from previous forward interven-
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advantage were once again reported to have taken place: “[A]t times trad-
ing was reported as very aggressive, including the sale of large parcels to the
market at any price and greater than normal trading in periods of illiquid-
ity, sometimes apparently with sustained price impact” (FSF 2000, 141).
5.3.7 The Conclusions of the FSF Study on 
Market Dynamics in Turmoil Episodes
In our analysis above we have often built upon the FSF (2000) study, an
extensive study whose overall results are consistent with the key implica-
tions of our theoretical analysis. The ambivalent conclusions of this study
provide an excellent summary of the complex and multifaceted debate on
the role of HLIs in currency crises:
• “Under normal market conditions, HLIs do not threaten the stability
of medium-sized markets. Together with other market participants,
HLIs can play an important role translating views about the funda-
mentals into prices and face the same incentives as other market par-
ticipants to avoid outsized positions. Because of their ability and will-
ingness to take leveraged positions, HLIs can be an important source
of market liquidity and can, over time, contribute positively to market
development.”
•“ From time to time, HLIs may establish large and concentrated posi-
tions in small and medium-sized markets. When this is the case, HLIs
have the potential to materially inﬂuence market dynamics. The size
and duration of the eﬀects can be ampliﬁed through herding or through
other market participants moving to the sidelines and depend critically
on the strength of the fundamentals and the behavior of ‘ongoing’
transactors in the domestic currency.”
•“ T he judgment as to whether HLI positions are destabilizing has to be
made on a case-by-case basis. Several members of the study group be-
lieve that large HLI positions exacerbated the situations in several of
the case-study economies in 1998, contributing to unstable market dy-
namics and signiﬁcant spillovers. These members of the group are of
the view that HLI positions and tactics can at times represent a signif-
icant independent source of pressure. Some other group members do
not think that there is suﬃcient evidence to advance such judgments on
the basis of the 1998 experience, given the uncertainty prevailing in the
markets at that time. They believe that the impact of HLIs on markets
is likely to be very short-lived and that, provided fundamentals are
strong, HLI positions and strategies are unlikely to present a major in-
dependent driving force in market dynamics.”
•“ T he group is concerned about the possible impact on market dynam-
ics of some of the aggressive practices cited in the case-study economies
The Role of Large Players in Currency Crises 253during 1998; it is not, however, able to reach a conclusion on the scale
of these practices, whether manipulation was involved and their impact
on market integrity. Some group members believe that the threshold for
assessing manipulation can be set too high and that some of the ag-
gressive practices raise important issues for market integrity. They are
of the view that there is suﬃcient evidence to suggest that attempted
manipulation can and does occur in foreign exchange markets and
should be a serious source of concern for policy makers (FSF 2000,
125–26).
As a conclusion to the assessment of the 1990s crisis episodes, it is worth
recalling that foreign exchange market pressures rapidly diminished in the
late summer and early fall of 1998, when large HFs and other HLIs reduced
their activity following a number of events: the Russian devaluation and de-
fault; the collapse of LTCM and the ensuing liquidity and credit squeeze in
the ﬁnancial markets of advanced economies; the sharp appreciation of the
yen in September and October of 1998, which brought losses to those HLIs
that had heavily shorted the yen and played the aforementioned carry trade.
Also, “unorthodox” policy actions such as the massive Hong Kong inter-
vention in its equity market, capital controls in Malaysia, and intervention
against bond-shorters in South Africa contributed to a squeeze on the
speculative short positions of HLIs.51
5.4 Conclusion
This paper has presented a theoretical and empirical analysis of the role
of large players in currency crises. Our study contributes to an analytical lit-
erature that, while still in its infancy, is making signiﬁcant progress in un-
derstanding how the existence of large players may aﬀect foreign exchange
market dynamics. On the empirical side, results are constrained by the fact
that detailed data on major market participants’ positions and strategies
are limited. However, the evidence presented in our paper and in a number
of recent studies sheds some light on the role played by large players in re-
cent episodes of currency turmoil.
In sum, our analysis does not contradict the conventional wisdom that
large players possess the following traits: they are better informed or per-
ceived to be better informed, they are able to build sizable short positions
via leverage; they tend to move ﬁrst based on an assessment of fundamen-
tal weaknesses; they contribute to currency pressures in the presence of
weak or uncertain fundamentals; they are closely monitored by smaller in-
vestors prone to herd on their observed or guessed positions, even when the
small traders would act as contrarians based on the private information
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51. See the 1999 IMF International Capital Market Report (IMF 1999) for a detailed dis-
cussion of these and other “unorthodox” interventions in ﬁnancial markets.available to them; and they may recur to aggressive trading practices. Un-
doubtedly, future theoretical and empirical research will shed further light
on many of the aspects discussed here.
We conclude with three observations. First, the role of large players in ﬁ-
nancial markets may have recently changed. Some large macro hedge funds
and other HLIs have closed down or retrenched their operations.52 Perhaps
in part as a consequence of this retrenchment, there is now some concern
that liquidity in the forex market may have been reduced and greater asset
price volatility may have emerged. However, it is still too early to assess
whether such liquidity shrinkage has occurred and what its causes and con-
sequences are.
Second, the disappearance of several large macro HFs after 1998 may in
part be the result of the ongoing phase-out of ﬁxed exchange rate regimes;
one after another, most noninstitutionalized exchange rate pegs have been
abandoned (Mexico, Asia, Russia, Brazil). Large macro bets against a peg
are easier to make, since large short positions can be built at low cost when
the monetary authority provides foreign currency at a ﬁxed price. With ﬂex-
ible rates, instead, there is always a two-sided currency risk, and the costs of
building short positions depend on whether, and to what extent, other
agents (other than the central bank) are willing to take the opposite side of
these transactions. Attempts to build speculative positions lead to continu-
ous time movements in the exchange rate, reducing not only the incentive to
speculate but also the scope for sharp (thus proﬁtable) adjustment. Indeed,
large macro directional bets on the ﬂexible exchange rates of the G3
economies allegedly led to losses in 1999 and 2000, contributing to the even-
tual demise of some large macro HFs.
Third, the policy implications of the role of large players in market dy-
namics are complex and multifaceted. The oﬃcial sector began to address
these issues within the HLI working group of the FSF. This group consid-
ered both the implications of HLIs for systemic risk in global ﬁnancial mar-
kets and the role of HLIs in market dynamics in small and medium-sized
economies.
Regarding systemic risk, the recommendations of this working group’s
report mirrored many of the recommendations of the report of the U.S.
President’s Working Group on Capital Markets (1999). The recommenda-
tions included measures aimed at better risk management by HLIs and their
counterparties (better credit assessments, better exposure measurement, es-
tablishment of credit limits, and collateral management techniques), better
creditor oversight (greater intensity of scrutiny of ﬁrms that are falling short
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52. LTCM was closed down following its near collapse in 1998; the Tiger Group funds were
closed down in 2000 following a period of poor investment returns; the operations of the
Quantum Group funds have been scaled down; the Moore Capital Group decided to return $2
billion of capital to its investors; and several forex prop desks of large ﬁnancial ﬁrms have been
either closed or scaled down in their operations.and periodic reaﬃrmation of compliance with sound practices), and en-
hanced practices of public disclosure and reporting to authorities.
Regarding the issue of market dynamics in small and medium-sized
economies, the HLI report also made a number of recommendations. First,
the report noted that enhanced risk management practices could address
some of the concerns raised by emerging markets by constraining excessive
leverage. Second, it noted that trading on organized exchanges, requiring
market participants to report to regulators, and possibly requiring position
limits as well could alleviate some of the pressures caused by large and con-
centrated positions. Third, the FSF recommended that market participants
themselves articulate guidelines for market conduct in the area of foreign
exchange trading. These market guidelines would address the concerns of
smaller and medium-sized economies about the trading practices that
might have contributed to exacerbating market pressures in period of mar-
ket turmoil.
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Comment Jaume Ventura
The paper by Corsetti, Pesenti, and Roubini studies how the presence of
large investors aﬀects the nature of currency crises. Its motivation is the al-
leged prominent role that some hedge funds and investment banks have
played in recent episodes of this sort. Regardless of whether this is factually
correct or not, I am convinced that the topic is of great interest. In this com-
ment, I raise a few issues that the paper either overlooks or does not treat
with suﬃcient clarity. To illustrate them, I use a bare-bones version of the
model that removes all uncertainty (public and private) about fundamentals.
The simplest model is the “speculators” game. In this game, one or more
investors command resources of mass 1. Let   be the state of the country or
fundamentals, and assume everybody observes it. Deﬁne  ∈ 0,1 as the frac-
tion of resources that are used to attack the currency. The currency collapses
if and only if fundamentals are weak relative to the size of the attack, that is,
if    . Investors have no intrinsic interest in the country. If they abstain from
attacking the currency, their payoﬀis zero independently of whether the cur-
rency collapses. Investors see the country merely as an opportunity to make
proﬁts from inconsistent policy making. They can commit their resources to
the attack by paying a per-unit cost of t   1. If the currency collapses, they
gain a per-unit proﬁt equal to one. Otherwise their proﬁt is zero. With these
assumptions, we can write the payoﬀ matrix of investors in table 5C.1:
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nology and a faculty research fellow of the National Bureau of Economic Research.Assume ﬁrst that the unit mass of resources is uniformly distributed
among a continuum of atomistic investors. If   1, the currency does not
collapse regardless of the investors’ actions. Knowing this, nobody attacks,
and     0. If   0, the currency collapses regardless of the investors’ ac-
tions. Knowing this, all investors attack and     1. In the range 0    1,
there are two possible equilibria. If investors believe nobody else will attack,
then   0 and the currency does not collapse. If investors believe everybody
else will attack, then     1 and the currency collapses. How do investors se-
lect the equilibrium when this happens? Simply assume there is a sunspot
variable that coordinates them and takes one of two values, ATTACK and
NO ATTACK, with probabilities   and 1 –  , respectively. Under this as-
sumption, if 0    1 the currency collapses with probability  .
Assume next a fraction   1 of the unit mass of resources is owned by a
single large investor and the rest is uniformly distributed among the con-
tinuum of atomistic investors. How does this change in market structure
aﬀect the likelihood of a currency crisis? To develop some intuition, con-
sider three alternative (and arbitrary) rules of behavior for the large in-
vestor:
1. The large investor is a hawk. Assume the large investor always attacks.
If     , the currency collapses. If   1, the currency does not collapse. If
    1, there are two equilibria. If atomistic investors believe that only
the large investor will attack, then    , and the currency does not collapse.
If atomistic investors believe everybody else will attack, then     1, and the
currency collapses. The presence of a hawkish large investor raises the lower
threshold of the range of multiple equilibria. As   → 1, this range disap-
pears as this threshold converges to 1.
2. The large investor is a dove. Assume the large investor never attacks. If
  0, the currency collapses. If   1 –  , the currency does not collapse. If
0    1 –  , there are two equilibria. If atomistic investors believe nobody
else will attack, then     0, and the currency does not collapse. If atomistic
investors believe other atomistic investors will attack, then 1   1 –  , and
the currency collapses. The presence of a dovish large investor lowers the
upper threshold of the range of multiple equilibria. As  →1, this range dis-
appears as this threshold converges to zero.
3. The large investor follows the crowd. Assume the large investor attacks
only if it expects other investors to attack. If   0, the currency collapses.
If   1, the currency does not collapse. If 0    1, there are two equilib-
ria. If investors believe nobody else will attack, then   0, and the currency
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Table 5C.1 “Speculators” Game
Collapse No Collapse
ATTACK 1 – t –t
NO ATTACK 0 0does not collapse. If investors believe everybody else will attack, then   1,
and the currency collapses. The presence of a follow-the-crowd large in-
vestor has no eﬀect on the equilibrium of the game.
What are these examples telling us? As   grows, the large investor gradu-
ally replaces atomistic investors in the task of allocating resources.1If its in-
vestment strategy is more aggressive than those of the atomistic investors it
replaces, more resources will be used to attack the currency in some range
of the fundamentals. An obvious reason for this is that the resources trans-
ferred are now invested more aggressively. However, because the actions of
investors are strategic complements, the presence of a more aggressive in-
vestor also leads other investors to be more aggressive. This brings me to the
ﬁrst point: The eﬀects of a large investor on the likelihood of a currency crisis
depend on how aggressive its strategy is relative to those of the atomistic in-
vestors it replaces.
None of the examples above describe the solution to the “speculators”
game. They instead describe the solutions to three alternative games in
which atomistic investors are rational speculators, but large investors are ir-
rational in some speciﬁc ways. The only purpose of the examples was to de-
velop intuition on how the behavior of a large investor aﬀects the likelihood
of a crisis and the behavior of other investors. Assume from now on that the
large investor is rational and chooses its investment strategy optimally. Is
this enough to tell us whether the large investor behaves more or less ag-
gressively than the atomistic investors it is replacing?
Let’s start by describing the actual solution to the “speculators” game. If
  1, the currency does not collapse. If     , the currency collapses be-
cause the large investor always attacks. If we assume that it does not, then
its payoﬀ is zero rather than     (1 – t)   0. If     1, there are two equi-
libria. If investors believe nobody else will attack, then     0, and the cur-
rency does not collapse. If investors believe everybody else will attack, then
    1, and the currency collapses. In this range the currency collapses with
probability  . Note that the large investor chooses a more aggressive in-
vestment strategy than that of the atomistic investors it is replacing. In the
range 0     it chooses to attack with probability 1, whereas the (re-
placed) atomistic investors attack with probability  . For all other values of
the fundamentals, the strategy of the large investor is identical to those of
the (replaced) atomistic ones. Therefore, the presence of a large investor
raises the likelihood of a currency crisis.
Is this a robust result? A simple modiﬁcation of the game dispels any
hope in this direction. In the “speculators” game, investors have no intrin-
sic interest in the country and only see in the latter an opportunity to proﬁt
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1. Naturally, this is in a ﬁgurative sense. I am analyzing a class of games indexed by  . Within
each game there is no transfer of resources among investors.from inconsistent policies. From their perspective, the best possible sce-
nario is a currency collapse. Consider instead a “creditors” game, in which
investors have already invested in the country a unit mass of resources. Per-
haps they have lent to domestic banks or the government at an interest rate
r higher than the world interest rate of zero. The risk, of course, is that the
currency devalues by an amount d   r. In the “creditors” game, the best
possible scenario for investors is that the currency does not collapse. If in-
vestors attack (i.e., sell their investments and leave the country), their payoﬀ
is the world interest rate regardless of whether the currency collapses or not.
If they do not attack (i.e., keep their investments and stay in the country),
their payoﬀis rif the currency does not collapse and r– d 0 if it does. This
is shown in the payoﬀ matrix in table 5C.2.
As a description of recent currency crises, the “creditors” game seems at
least as realistic as the “speculators” game. Moreover, in the absence of a
large investor, both games exhibit the same equilibria.2 However, the pres-
ence of a large investor leads to opposite results in both games. To see this,
let’s describe the solution to the “creditors” game: If   0, the currency col-
lapses regardless of the actions of investors. If   1 –  , the currency does
not collapse because the large investor never attacks. If we assume that it does
not, then its payoﬀis zero rather than    r 0. If 0    1 –  , there are two
equilibria. If investors believe nobody else will attack, then   0, and the cur-
rency does not collapse. If investors believe everybody else will attack, then
    1, and the currency collapses. Assuming that the same sunspot variable
selects the equilibrium in both games, the currency collapses with probabil-
ity  in the range of multiple equilibria. In the “creditors” game, the large in-
vestor chooses a less aggressive strategy than that of the atomistic investors
it is replacing, and as a result the likelihood of a currency crisis decreases.
The common thread in these two games is that atomistic investors are
nervous about the behavior of other investors. There is always a preferred
outcome, but achieving it requires coordination. In the “speculators” game,
the preferred outcome was to proﬁt from policy inconsistencies. In the
“creditors” game, the preferred outcome was to preserve good investment
opportunities in the country. For some range of fundamentals, the large in-
vestor can decide market outcomes and eﬀectively choose its preferred
equilibrium. Because the incentives of small and large investors are aligned,
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2. They even exhibit the same payoﬀs if r   1 – t and d   1.
Table 5C.2 “Creditors” Game
Collapse No Collapse
ATTACK 0 0
NO ATTACK r – drthis equilibrium will also be preferred by atomistic investors. This leads us
to the second point: With atomistic investors, a coordination failure is pos-
sible in that the equilibrium chosen is “bad” from the investors’ perspective.
The presence of a large investor partially solves this coordination failure and
raises the likelihood of achieving the equilibrium considered “good” from the
investors’ perspective.
A natural generalization of this intuition applies in games in which there
is conﬂict among investors. The simplest illustration of this point is a
“mixed” game, in which a fraction   of the unit mass of resources is owned
by “speculators” (i.e., investors with the payoﬀ matrix of the “speculators”
game) and the rest by “creditors” (i.e., investors with the payoﬀ matrix of
the “creditors” game). If all investors are atomistic, the “mixed” game de-
livers the same equilibrium as the previous two games. However, the eﬀects
of a large investor depend on its type in an intuitive fashion. It is easy to
check that the presence of a large investor lowers the range of multiple equi-
libria and raises the likelihood of achieving the equilibrium that is preferred
by investors of its own type.3
The last issue I want to take on here is that of the interaction between the
large investor and the government. In the games analyzed so far, governments
can take no action that aﬀects the likelihood of a currency crisis. In real
episodes, governments do not passively wait until investors have made up
their minds. On the contrary, they actively try to aﬀect their decisions through
announcements and promises of various sorts. Does the presence of a large
investor aﬀect the government’s options to aﬀect the resolution of a crisis?
Consider the “speculators” game again, but assume now that the gov-
ernment can bribe investors. More precisely, before investors choose their
strategies, the government can credibly commit to pay them b if the cur-
rency does not collapse. Clearly, this bribe has no eﬀect at all on the out-
come of the game if the fundamentals are too strong or too weak, that is, if
  1 or   0. Therefore, there is no point in the government’s oﬀering it in
this case. The question I address here is whether the government can use a
bribe to aﬀect the outcome of the game when fundamentals are in the in-
termediate region, that is, 0      .4 In this region, the bribe transforms
the payoﬀ matrix of investors as shown in table 5C.3.
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3. More fun is possible if we allow for two large investors with diﬀerent types in the “mixed”
game. Assume that each of them commands a fraction  of the resources of her type. Then the
range of multiple equilibria is       1 –   (1 –  ). As   → 1, the range of multiple equi-
libria disappears as both thresholds converge to  .
4. It is crucial here that this bribe be contingent on the outcome of the game (or the collec-
tive actions of the investors) and not on each individual investor’s action. If the latter type of
conditioning were feasible, an intriguing possibility arises. Assume that, in the range 0    
1, the government promises a very large payment if the currency collapses to all those investors
(large and small) that did not attack. If this promise is credible, the government has found a
free lunch. Now the dominant strategy for all investors is never to attack when 0    1, so
the government has coordinated investors toward the desired equilibrium. Because the cur-
rency never collapses, this has been achieved at zero cost.Assume ﬁrst that all investors are atomistic and, within the range of mul-
tiple equilibria, they select the equilibrium with the now-familiar sunspot
variable that leads them to attack with probability   and not to attack with
probability 1 –  .5 Then the presence of a bribe does not inﬂuence the equi-
librium of the game or the likelihood of a currency crisis. Why? Altering the
incentives of investors makes no diﬀerence if the latter cannot coordinate
their actions to reach their preferred outcome. Because the bribe would be
ineﬀective, the government will never oﬀer it in the ﬁrst place.
Things can be quite diﬀerent, however, if there is a large investor and the
bribe is suﬃciently attractive. Assume b ≥ 1 – t. In this case, the solution of
game is as follows: If   0, the currency collapses, whereas if   1 –  , the
currency does not collapse. If 0    1 –  , the currency collapses with
probability  . If b   1 – t, the solution of the game is the same as if there
were no bribe. Therefore, a large enough bribe succeeds in reducing the like-
lihood of a currency collapse. If the government attaches enough value to
sustaining the currency, the equilibrium bribe is 1 – t. Otherwise, the equi-
librium bribe is zero. What is going on? If the bribe is attractive enough, in-
vestors no longer prefer a currency collapse. They would rather take the
bribe instead. If investors can coordinate their eﬀorts even partially to reach
their preferred outcome, the government has an incentive to use a bribe to
align this preference with its own. When this happens, the large investor
changes its strategy, and this reduces the likelihood of a currency collapse.6
In the presence of a large investor, the outcome of the “speculators” game
is not robust to giving the government the option to oﬀer a bribe, since the
latter will be used to aﬀect the incentives of the large investor and the out-
come of the game. The same is not true for the “creditors” game, because
the incentives of the government and the large investor are already aligned.
Any government bribe would simply be a waste of resources and, recogniz-
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Table 5C.3 “Speculators” Game with a Bribe
Collapse No Collapse
ATTACK 1 – tb – t
NO ATTACK 0 b
5. This assumption now has some bite. The presence of the bribe has converted the “specu-
lators” game into a Stackelberg game with the government as the leader. This game has a much
larger set of equilibria, which includes strategies that condition the attack on the bribe, such as
“if b   b∗, attack; otherwise, don’t.” In fact, there is an inﬁnite number of equilibria! The
sunspot variable eﬀectively rules out all of these additional equilibria, so that we keep only the
two familiar ones.
6. The bribe might be too expensive in this game. After all, it must be at least as high as the
beneﬁts that all investors receive if the currency collapses. There might be situations in which
the government can target the bribe to reach the large investor without much of a giveaway
to the atomistic ones. If this type of targeting is feasible, then the lowest bribe that would
change the outcome of the game is   (1 – t) instead of 1 – t.ing that, the government does not oﬀer one. This leads me to the third and
ﬁnal point: The presence of a large investor tends to reduce the likelihood of a
currency crisis, because the government can manipulate its incentives and use
it to partially solve the coordination failure in such a way as to avoid a currency
collapse.
When we attempt to map the concept of a bribe to reality, two ideas come
to mind. The ﬁrst and obvious one is reforms. The government might have
the ability to credibly commit to some costly policy changes that raise the
proﬁtability of foreign investments in the country. Notice, though, that
these reforms must be made contingent on the currency’s not collapsing.
This seems somewhat to contradict actual events, because many countries
wait to implement costly reforms until a crisis has already occurred.
A second possibility is to think of the bribe as a high interest rate. Be-
cause the value of loans falls after a currency collapse, a high interest rate
can be seen as a bribe that is conditional on the currency’s not collapsing.
In this case, the simple model here gives us some insights regarding the
eﬀectiveness of raising the interest rate as a defense against a currency at-
tack. If there is a large investor of the “speculator” type, this defense will
succeed for some values of the fundamentals. If the large investor is of the
“creditor” type or all investors are atomistic, this defense will never suc-
ceed.
Where do we go from here? In this comment, I have used a standard
model of coordination failures to raise some questions and submit some
conjectures on the role of large investors in currency crises. My hope is that
more researchers will devote their time to this problem. Our knowledge of
how market structure aﬀects international capital ﬂows is, to say the least,
rudimentary, yet I suspect the payoﬀ to research in this area might be quite
large. Models of perfect competition have been unable so far to explain ba-
sic observations such as why long-term capital ﬂows are so small, or why
short-term capital ﬂows are so volatile. Perhaps models of imperfect com-
petition will have more success at this task. However, as the examples here
show, sorting out the arguments and the facts is likely to prove a long and
treacherous journey.
Discussion Summary
The discussion centered on two themes: the theoretical treatment of large
players in the model and the empirical part of the paper.
Aaron Tornell raised the issue of there being more than one large player.
There are usually several large actors in a given market, and the industrial
organization literature suggests that the ways that a monopoly and an oli-
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player, the players interact strategically with each other, and the logic in the
paper—which focuses on the interaction between the single large player
and many small players—may not carry over in such a situation. He argued
that we need a theory that is robust to the number of large players in the
market.
Michael P. Dooleymade the remark that the largest, highly leveraged, and
nonfundamental speculator in these markets is the central bank. In the
model’s setting, one big player (a hedge fund) is followed by many small
players, but in reality, the central bank fulﬁlls the role of large player. As he
playfully put it, the central bank sits there with a big hammer and threatens
to crush the little players should they bet against it. He agreed with Tornell
that the behavior of several large players needs to be modelled instead of the
interaction of small players with a single large one.
Roberto Chang agreed with both and commented that the governments
in most crisis countries did (or tried to) punish speculators severely. How-
ever, this behavior is not represented in the model; instead, the government
is assumed to carry out a mechanical role.
Martin Feldstein commented on the role of large players. He said that we
tend to think that large players play a negative role because they are eﬀec-
tive in increasing the probability of crises, as suggested in the paper. But
perhaps the large players are performing a useful role as potential disci-
pliners. For example, they force some countries to move toward ﬂexible ex-
change rates, and they make countries adopt more sensible domestic ﬁscal
policies. Federico Sturzenegger disagreed with the role of large players; he
said that the fact that the large players had moved out of the market sug-
gests they could not do anything. Rudi Dornbusch gave a diﬀerent explana-
tion for the exit of hedge funds (large players) from the market: the big play-
ers are now old and rich enough!
Sebastian Edwards raised a related question regarding the exchange rate
regime and large players. This paper argues that many large players have
stopped operating partly due to the fact that a large number of emerging na-
tions abandoned the pegged exchange rate system. The current view on ex-
change rate regimes is increasingly in favor of the two corner solutions. He
asked whether countries that chose to have a ﬁxed regime (in the form of
dollarization or currency boards) are more likely to be aﬀected by large
players and are more subject to crises.
On the empirical part of the paper, Feldstein asked what the U.S. hedge
fund data cover. What is “U.S.” for this purpose? Moreover, if a hedge fund
is oﬀshore, how oﬀshore can it be to evade being part of the data set?
Linda S. Goldberg suggested that the paper could do more hypothesis
tests in the empirical part. For example, on the relationship between the net
foreign borrowing position and exchange rates, what part of the change of
net foreign position of large players is due to exchange rate movements, and
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of players and action, what incremental dynamics are expected for ex-
change rate movements based on the change of position? What are the tim-
ing and nature of the dynamics predicted by the theory? Can one do some-
thing over time by looking at diﬀerent dynamics related to the change of
composition of the players, or the change of relative sizes of players as pre-
dicted by the theory?
Tornell said that the paper only shows that large asset price changes are
correlated with the position of some large ﬁrms. In order to say this is sup-
portive to the theory of the paper, one should also show that there is no cor-
relation between asset price changes and the position of small ﬁrms (as
pointed out by Min Shi).
Sturzenegger raised a question on endogeneity in the relationship be-
tween the change of net foreign position and exchange rate, namely, how
does exchange rate change aﬀect the change of net foreign position? He also
suggested that one could conduct some case studies, for example, on how
large players make announcements and try to inﬂuence the market. These
events could also be used to do hypothesis tests.
Kristin J. Forbes said that the paper focuses on the role of hedge funds in
exchange rate markets only. One extension could be to look at the role of
large hedge funds in equity markets. There are some assumptions in the
model that do not apply to equity markets. For example, when one com-
pares hedge funds and mutual funds in this market, it seems that mutual
funds have superior information, greater transparency, and less leverage;
more importantly, hedge funds can short, while other investors cannot.
Therefore, it could be interesting to study the broader implications of the
model regarding hedge funds in other markets.
Shang-Jin Wei mentioned the only three academic papers on the role of
large players and argued that they do not provide supportive evidence for
the role of large players. In the Korean case that Kim and Wei looked at, the
oﬀshore funds, which are mostly hedge funds, do not seem to be aggressive
in the sense of pursuing momentum trading relative to non-oﬀshore funds.
The study by Brown, Goetzman, and Park (1998) of hedge funds based on
payoﬀ data does not suggest that hedge funds were playing a special role in
the Asian crises. Moreover, the fact that Quantum and Tiger groups got oﬀ
the market is consistent with the view that they are not doing particularly
well on an ex post proﬁt basis, which is also conﬁrmed in the Korean case.
Thus, his question was whether we are in the stage of identifying supportive
evidence for the large player models.
Giancarlo Corsettitalked brieﬂy on the theory. This is a very exciting ﬁeld
of research, and this paper is the ﬁrst step toward understanding the role of
large players. He said that there is a group of students and faculty working
on various aspects of the topic—such as oligopoly, game-theoretical ap-
proach, risk aversion, credit constraint, and welfare—at Yale right now.
266 Giancarlo Corsetti, Paolo Pesenti, and Nouriel RoubiniPaolo Pesenti agreed with Martin Feldstein on the positive role of large
players. Major market participants can indeed help translate views about
fundamentals into prices and can represent sources of market liquidity.
Problems arise, however, when aggressive trading has a destabilizing im-
pact, to the extent that highly leveraged institutions attempt to inﬂuence
market dynamics to their own advantage.
On the “disappearance” of large players, Pesenti cited thirty-six reporters
qualiﬁed as major market participants in 1996 (twenty-nine of which were
commercial banks), but the number was down to twenty-ﬁve in 2000, with
eighteen banking institutions.
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